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Abstract
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with
monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with
verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents’ declarations on allocated goods
can be fully verified before payments are performed, and where (ii) verification is not
used to punish agents whose declarations resulted in incorrect ones. Within this setting,
a mechanism is designed that is shown to be truthful, efficient, and budget-balanced, and
where agents’ utilities are fairly determined by the Shapley value of suitable coalitional
games. The proposed mechanism is however shown to be #P-complete. Thus, to deal
with applications with many agents involved, two polynomial-time randomized variants are
also proposed: one that is still truthful and efficient, and which is approximately budget-
balanced with high probability, and another one that is truthful in expectation, while still
budget-balanced and efficient.
1. Introduction
Whenever the outcome of some social choice process depends on the information collected
from a number of self-interested agents, strategic issues may come into play. Indeed, agents
may find convenient to misreport their types, i.e., the relevant information they own as
their private knowledge, so that the best possible solution cannot be achieved. In these
cases, mechanism design techniques can be used as solution approaches, which augment
combinatorial algorithms with appropriate monetary payments, aimed at motivating all
agents to truthfully report their private types (see, e.g., Vazirani, Nisan, Roughgarden, &
Tardos, 2007; Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009).
On the class of social choice utilitarian problems, agent types encode (monetary) val-
uations over the set of all possible solutions and the goal is to compute a solution max-
imizing the social welfare, i.e., the sum of agents’ true evaluations. A prominent role in
mechanism design for problems of this class is played by the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG)
paradigm (Vickery, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973), which is a general method for design-
ing truthful mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms where truth-telling is a dominant strategy for each
agent. In particular, VCG mechanisms are efficient. That is, they guarantee that a solution
maximizing the social welfare is actually computed. However, they are not budget-balanced,
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i.e., the algebraic sum of the monetary transfers is not zero and mechanisms from this class
can run into deficit. In fact, this is a well-known drawback of VCG mechanisms (see, e.g.,
Archer & Tardos, 2007), but it is essentially the best one can hope to do, given classical
impossibility theorems (Green & Laffont, 1977; Hurwicz, 1975), stating that no truthful
mechanism can be designed to be always efficient and budget-balanced.
In many practical applications, as the one that inspired the present work, payments to
agents can be performed after the final outcome is known, so that some kind of verification
on reported types might be possible. Mechanisms with verification have been introduced
by Green and Laffont (1986) and subsequently studied in a number of papers. For instance,
Nisan and Ronen (2001) considered verification for a task scheduling problem: We have
some agents declaring the amount of time they need to solve each task, and the goal is to
have all tasks being solved, by minimizing the completion time of the last-solved one (hence,
the make-span). In this context, payments are computed after the actual tasks release times
have been observed, so that we have, for instance, the ability to “punish” some agent whose
declared ability has been verified to be different than its actual performance in the process.
Note that the knowledge of the actual outcome represents a source of additional in-
formation to define payment rules, as it might partially reveal agents’ types. However,
this additional power is not considered in the classical mechanism-design setting. In fact,
whenever verification is allowed, some (classical) impossibility results might no longer hold.
Compared to standard mechanisms (see, e.g., Vazirani et al., 2007), those with verifi-
cation have received considerably less attention in the literature (see, e.g., Nisan & Ronen,
2001; Auletta, De Prisco, Penna, & Persiano, 2009; Penna & Ventre, 2009; Krysta &
Ventre, 2010; Ferrante, Parlato, Sorrentino, & Ventre, 2009). In particular, these works
consider a verification ability that is partial, in the sense that agents’ (mis)reporting is re-
stricted to true types plus certain lies (e.g., values that are lower than the true ones), and
that verification is focused to detect such lies only. An extension of this basic model has
been recently proposed by Caragiannis, Elkind, Szegedy, and Yu (2012), who assume no
a-priori restrictions on the agents’ reported types, within a setting where an agent cheating
on her/his type will be caught with some probability that may depend on her/his true type,
the reported type, or both. In fact, despite these different facets of the verification power,
most of the mechanisms with verification proposed in the literature share the idea of provid-
ing incentives to truthfully report private types by exploiting the intimidation of punishing
those agents that will be caught lying. Moreover, while budget limits have been considered
in some approaches (see, e.g., Nisan & Ronen, 2001), no mechanism with verification has
been designed to be budget-balanced, with the focus being on truthfulness and efficiency.
In the paper, we study mechanisms with verification from the same perspective as Cara-
giannis et al. (2012), in particular by considering a setting where there is no restriction
on the agents’ reported types. However, differently from this work, we assume that verifi-
cation is deterministic, i.e., all incorrect declarations on allocated goods will be eventually
detected. This leads to a stronger verification ability, which could be in principle used
to easily enforce truthfulness by just punishing those agents whose declarations have been
checked to be incorrect ones. However, such an approach would be hardly acceptable by
agents in real-life applications, because a true punishment would require a clear proof of a
malevolent behavior. Indeed note that, in practice, possible discrepancies between agents’
declarations and third-party verified values may be due to many different reasons, in par-
2
ticular to the subjective judgment of the verifier. Based on this observation and motivated
by a real-world application domain, we will assume in the paper that only a limited use
of such verification power can be made, and indeed that mechanisms have to be designed
which are not based on punishments—while nonetheless resulting to be truthful, efficient,
and even budget-balanced.
1.1 Mechanisms for Fair Division with Monetary Compensation
We consider mechanisms with verification in the context of fair allocation problems (see,
e.g., Moulin, 2003; Young, 1994; William, 2011). We assume that a set of indivisible goods
to be allocated to a set of agents is given. Each agent is equipped with a private preference
relation, which is just encoded as a real-valued function (basically, a monetary valuation)
over all possible goods—formal definitions are in Section 3. An agent can have allocated
more then one good, in which case her/his evaluation is additive over them. Moreover,
goods are non-sharable, i.e., each good can be allocated to one agent at most. However,
monetary transfers are allowed, in terms of both payments charged to agents and monetary
compensations provided to them. The goal is to find an efficient allocation, that is, an
allocation maximizing the total value of the allocated goods, by designing rules guaranteeing
that certain desirable properties are achieved, such as truthfulness and individual rationality,
i.e., no agent is ever worse off than he would be without participating to the mechanism.
Moreover, we want to obtain outcomes that are “politically” acceptable. That is, agents
should perceive the designed mechanism as a fair one (see, e.g., Brandt & Endriss, 2012),
independently of the rules leading them to be honest. For instance, it is desirable that no
agent envies the allocation of any another agent, or that the selected outcome is Pareto
efficient, i.e., there must be no different allocation such that every agent gets at least the
same utility and one of them even improves.
Note that the above model for fair allocation is general enough to deal with many prac-
tical scenarios, and it has been indeed intensively studied in the literature. One example
application is parking space and benefit allocation at a workplace, where each employee
gets a parking space and a share from a fixed benefits package. House allocation problems
are another classical example, where agents collectively own a set of houses, and we look
for a systematic way of exclusively assigning a house to each agent, possibly with monetary
compensations. A third example is job allocation among a group of employees, e.g., assign-
ing an unexpected task among the business units of a corporate, where a job and possibly
a monetary compensation is assigned to each employee. Finally, yet another classical ap-
plication is room assignment-rent division, where a group of agents shall rent a house, with
each of them getting a room and paying a share of the rent of the house.
The model and, in particular, properties of fair allocations with indivisible objects
and monetary transfers have been studied, e.g., by Svensson (1983), Bevia´ (1998), Maskin
(1987), Tadenuma and Thomson (1993), Meertens, Potters, and Reijnierse (2002), Tade-
numa and Thomson (1991), Alkan, Demange, and Gale (1991), Willson (2003), Su (1999),
Yang (2001), Quinzii (1984), Sakai (2007). Moreover, procedures to compute fair allocations
have been proposed by Aragones (1995), Klijn (2000), Haake, Raith, and Su (2002), Brams
and Kilgour (2001), Potthoff (2002), Abdulkadirog˘lu, So¨nmez, and U¨nver (2004).
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None of the above listed approaches, however, can guarantee the elicitation of honest
preferences from the agents. In fact, the question of designing truthful and fair mechanisms
has been recently considered as well (Andersson & Svensson, 2008; Andersson, 2009; Svens-
son, 2009; Yengin, 2012; Ohseto, 2004; Porter, Shoham, & Tennenholtz, 2004; Shioura,
Sun, & Yang, 2006). In these approaches, while budget limits are sometimes enforced and
mechanisms are defined that cannot run into deficit, budget-balance is never guaranteed.
Indeed, this comes again with no surprise, given that no truthful mechanism can be simulta-
neously fair (e.g., envy-free or Pareto-efficient) and budget-balanced (see, e.g., Tadenuma
& Thomson, 1995; Alcalde & Barbera`, 1994; Andersson, Svensson, & Ehlers, 2010).
To circumvent this impossibility, approaches have been studied that focus on weaker
notions of truthfulness. For instance, Andersson et al. (2010) and Pathak (2009) consider
a notion of degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipula-
tion in allocation mechanisms, whereas the notion of weak strategy-proofness is considered
by Lindner (2010), i.e., cheating agents are always risking an actual loss, and are never
guaranteed to cheat successfully.
In this paper, we depart from the settings studied in all such earlier approaches, because
we are interested in applications where a form of verification is available to the mechanism at
the time of deciding monetary compensations among agents. It follows that the mechanism
may exploit the knowledge of private agents’ types, and hence classical impossibility results
may no longer hold. Indeed, by exploiting this knowledge, and even assuming a setting where
agents with verified incorrect declarations are not punished, we can show that it is possible
to design mechanisms for allocation problems that are truthful, efficient, budget-balanced,
individually rational, and fair. Note that having this kind of a-posteriori knowledge at
payment time is quite common to many applications. In fact, we were inspired by the
following real-world scenario, which will be later formalized in Section 2.
1.2 The Italian Research Assessment Program (VQR) 2004-2010
In 2012, the National Agency for the Evaluation of Universities and Research Institutes
(ANVUR) has promoted the ‘VQR’ assessment program devoted to evaluate the quality of
the whole Italian research production in the period 2004-2010. Every research structure R
has to select some research products, and submit them to ANVUR. While doing so, the
structure R is in competition with all other Italian research structures, as the outcome of
the evaluation will be used to proportionally transfer the funds that have been allocated
by the Ministry to support research activities in the next years (until data from a new
evaluation for the subsequent period will be available).
Every structure is then interested in selecting and submitting its best research products.
To this end, the program is articulated in three phases. First, authors are asked to self-
evaluate their products, according to some evaluation criteria defined by groups of experts
chosen by ANVUR. Here, it is assumed that, having such criteria, every author is able to
perform a ranking of her/his own products, ideally to equip each of them with a quality
score.1 In the second phase, based on the self-evaluations being collected, every structure R
1. The set of the possible scores is defined in the VQR guidelines. To our ends, this detail is immaterial
and scores are just viewed as (arbitrary) real numbers.
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selects and submits to ANVUR (at most) three products for each author affiliated to R,2 in
such a way that the sum of the declared, i.e., self-assessed, scores of the selected products is
the maximum possible one for structure R, and that each product is formally associated to
one author at most. Finally, ANVUR formulates its independent quality judgment about
submitted publications, and the sum of their “true” scores (i.e., those resulting by ANVUR
evaluation) is then the VQR score of R. Eventually, R will receive funds in the next years
proportionally to this score.
In fact, a VQR score is assigned not only to the structure R, but also to all its sub-
structures (e.g., to Departments, if R is a University). Of course, this has an impact on the
funds redistribution inside every research structure. Therefore, while it is clear that each
structure has to maximize the total value of the products submitted to ANVUR, whenever
the same product has different co-authors, some strategic issues come into play and co-
authors’ personal interest may induce them to cheat on the quality of their products, and
may lead to choices going far from the optimum (total) value. We thus believe that mecha-
nism design is of high practical interest in contexts resembling this one. In the mechanism,
since products are indivisible, i.e., each of them can be formally allocated to one author at
most, payments should reflect “adjustments” over the VQR scores, which suitably take into
account the various co-authors no matter to whom any publication is actually allocated.
Moreover, as payments can be computed at the end of the process on the basis of the VQR
scores made available by ANVUR, a mechanism with verification can be conceived, with
ANVUR playing the role of the verifier.
1.3 Contributions
Motivated by the above application scenario, in this paper, we study allocation problems in
a strategic setting where agents can misreport their private types, and we study mechanisms
with verification from both the algorithmic and the computational complexity viewpoint.
Algorithmic Issues. We show that in the given setting none of the classical impossibility
theorems discussed above holds. In particular, we exhibit a payment rule pξ that turns any
optimal allocation algorithm, i.e., any algorithm computing an optimal allocation given the
reported types, into a mechanism with verification such that:
◮ The mechanism is truthful. This is shown by pointing out a number of properties of
allocation problems which are of interest on their own.
◮ The mechanism is efficient, budget-balanced, individually rational, envy-free, and Pareto
efficient.
◮ The mechanism satisfies the following properties, which are in fact crucial—and hence
specifically discussed—for the case study of the Italian Research Assessment Program:
• The payment rule is indifferent w.r.t. the scores (possibly cheats) declared for goods
that do not occur in the allocation being selected (and hence that are not verified).
In theory, the feature is irrelevant given that truth-telling is a dominant strategy.
2. Actually, the number of publications is not always three, in some specific exceptions. Again, this is not
a relevant issue, as we shall see in the formalization in Section 3.
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In practice, this might be rather useful in the VQR program, because unsubmitted
research products with their unverified declared scores should have no influence on
the payments, as they have no influence on the actual score of the research structure
after the evaluation is carried out. Moreover, it is unlikely that a consensus can be
achieved on a mechanism where payments are based on unverified self-declarations.
• Verification is not used to force truthfulness by just punishing those agents whose
reported values are found different from the verified ones. Again, the rationale
is that a punishment approach would be hardly “politically” acceptable in this
context (charging university professors because of their self-evaluation about some
paper would require some convincing proof of their malicious behavior, and would
start never-ending disputes).
• The payment rule is indifferent w.r.t. the specific optimal allocation being selected
by the mechanism. Thus, the score of each researcher/substructure is univocally
determined by the overall score of the structure, and any researcher/substructure
does not have any reasonable argument against her/his structure because of possible
alternative allocations. In fact, this is a very strong kind of fairness property, which
immediately entails envy-freeness and Pareto-efficiency.
◮ Agents’ utilities are distributed according to the Shapley value of two suitably-associated
coalitional games—see, e.g., (Vazirani et al., 2007), for a comprehensive introduction
to sharing problems and coalitional games. In fact, the Shapley value is a prototypical
solution concept for fair division with monetary compensations, and its desirable prop-
erties in (games associated with) allocation problems have been largely studied in the
literature (e.g., Moulin, 1992; Maniquet, 2003; Mishra & Rangarajan, 2007).
Note that the Shapely value has been studied in mechanism-design contexts too, where
emphasis has been given to the pricing problem for a service provider (Moulin & Shenker,
1997; Moulin, 1999; Jain & Vazirani, 2001): The cost of providing a service is a function
of the sets of customers, and the goal is that of determining which customers (and at a
what price) have to receive it. The model gives rise to a cross-monotonic cost-sharing
game, where Shapley-value based sharing mechanisms can be defined that are truthful and
budget-balanced, and which achieve the lowest worst-case loss of efficiency over all utility
profiles (Moulin & Shenker, 1997). With this respect, the pricing rule pξ can abstractly be
viewed as a witness that, whenever (partial) verification is possible, Shapley-valued based
mechanisms may also be implemented with no loss of efficiency at all.
Complexity Issues. Computing an optimal allocation on the basis of the reported types
is an easy task, which can be carried out via adaptations of classical matching algorithms.
However, one might suspect that our mechanism is not computationally-efficient as it is
based on the computation of a Shapley value. This is indeed a challenging task that involves
iterating over all possible subsets of agents. We analyze these issues, and we provide the
following contributions:
◮ We show that computing the Shapley value for allocation problems is inherently in-
tractable, in fact, #P-complete. Note that, while membership results for #P are rather
common for problems involving Shapley value computations, #P-hardness results have
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only been proven so far for a few kinds of coalitional games, in particular, for weighted
voting games (Deng & Papadimitriou, 1994) and minimum spanning-tree games (Nag-
amochi, Zeng, Kabutoya, & Ibaraki, 1997).
◮ In order to deal with scenarios with many agents demanding for computational efficiency,
two modified rules, pˆξ and p¯ξ, are presented, which are founded on a fully polynomial-
time randomized approximation scheme for the Shapley value computation. The resulting
polynomial-time mechanisms retain most of the properties of pξ. In particular, the
mechanism based on pˆξ is truthful, efficient, and with high-probability it is approximately
budget-balanced. Instead, the mechanism based on p¯ξ is truthful in expectation, but
always efficient and budget-balanced.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The motivation scenario
for the research reported in the paper is analyzed in Section 2. Then, Section 3 illustrates
the formal framework and the basic concepts to design mechanisms with verification. The
payment rule pξ is defined and analyzed in Section 4. Connections with coalitional games are
pointed out in Section 5, while rules pˆξ and p¯ξ are defined in Section 6, where computational
issues are dealt with. A comparison with some related works is reported in Section 7, while
a few final remarks are eventually discussed in Section 8.
2. Motivating Example: The Italian Research Assessment Program
(VQR) 2004–2010
In this section we describe the motivating example and case study of the present work:
the program for evaluating all Italian research structures for their activities in years 2004–
2010. The evaluation is performed by ANVUR, the National Agency for the Evaluation
of Universities and Research Institutes (www.anvur.org). Substructures (e.g., University
departments) will also be evaluated, by considering the researchers affiliated to them.
2.1 Formalization
Let us hereinafter focus on a given structure R, let R be the set of researchers affiliated
to R and, for each r ∈ R, let products(r) be the set of the research products of r in the
given period 2004-2010. In the first phase of the program, each researcher r ∈ R associates
a quality score scorer(p) ∈ R with each product p ∈ products(r).
An allocation for R is then a function ψ mapping each researcher r ∈ R to a set of
publications ψ(r) ⊆ products(r) with |ψ(r)| ≤ 3 and with ψ(r) ∩ ψ(r′) = ∅, for each
r′ ∈ R \ {r}. In the second phase, the structure R computes an optimal allocation, i.e.,
an allocation ψ∗ such that
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈ψ∗(r) scorer(p) ≥
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈ψ(r) scorer(p), for each
possible allocation ψ. The goal of structure R is indeed to maximize its total score (social
welfare), and thus the funds that R eventually will receive. Note that this optimization
phase is based on the scores declared by researchers. Therefore, the goal of R will be
achieved if authors correctly/truthfully self-evaluate their products.
Example 2.1. Let us consider the simple scenario that is illustrated in Figure 1(I) by
exploiting an intuitive graphical notation. Assume that there are just two researchers, r1
and r2, affiliated to R. Moreover, assume that products(r1) = {p1, ..., p5} and products(r2) =
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Figure 1: Running example in Section 2.
{p4, ..., p8}, and notice that products p4 and p5 have been co-authored by r1 and r2. For
each pi ∈ products(r1) (resp., pi ∈ products(r2)), let the self-assessed score scorer1(pi)
(resp., scorer2(pi)) be the one associated with the edge connecting r1 (resp., r2) to pi.
Given this setting, it is then easily seen that an optimal allocation for R is ψ∗ such that
ψ∗(r1) = {p1, p2, p4} and ψ
∗(r2) = {p5, p7, p8}—see Figure 1(II). ✁
Let ψ∗ be the optimal allocation being selected by R. All products in
⋃
r∈R ψ
∗(r) are
then submitted to ANVUR for being evaluated (according to the criteria that are publicly
available). As a result of the third phase of the VQR program, each submitted product
p ∈
⋃
r∈R ψ
∗(r) is associated with a VQR score scoreVQR(p) ∈ R, which can be in principle
different from the score scorer(p) declared by some author r ∈ R. The overall VQR score of
the structure R, scoreVQR(ψ
∗) =
∑
r∈R
∑
p∈ψ∗(r) scoreVQR(p), will be eventually translated
to money, proportionally to the performance of R w.r.t. the performances of the other
research structures. Thus, it is actually immaterial to talk about scores or money in this
application scenario.
Example 2.2. Assume that there is a precise agreement between self-evaluations (leading to
the optimal allocation ψ∗ for structure R) and ANVUR evaluations, i.e., for each researcher
r ∈ R and each product p ∈ products(r) ∩ ψ∗(r), scoreVQR(p) = scorer(p) holds. Then, we
have that scoreVQR(ψ
∗) = 51—see again Figure 1(II). Moreover, the funds of R (actually,
the part of funds connected to the research performance) will be directly proportional to
51. Therefore, if another structure R′ gets 102 as VQR score, its (research-related) funds
will be double the funds of R. ✁
2.2 Division Rules and Desirable Properties
While the first aim of the VQR program is to evaluate the various Italian research structures,
it is known that the obtained information will be used to evaluate substructures, too (e.g.,
University departments). Thus, following the same principle of binding funds to VQR scores
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used for the main structures, it is natural to exploit such scores for money distribution inside
every research structure (in principle, up to research groups and individuals).
Of course, this poses the question of how the total score (money) of a structure can be
fairly distributed over its substructures (and possibly over individuals), in such a way to
reflect their actual contribution to the result achieved by the structure. Formally, we need
the definition of a division rule γ, that is, of a real-valued function that given a researcher
r ∈ R and an allocation ψ∗, returns the score γr(ψ
∗) of r under ψ∗. Then, slightly abusing
notation, for any substructure S ⊆ R (here just viewed as the set of its members), denote
by γS(ψ
∗) the value
∑
r∈S γr(ψ
∗).
Surprisingly, no division rule has been formalized in the assessment program, up to now,
and this is a source of confusion in many researchers. As a matter of fact, most researchers
believe that the score of substructures will be based on the naive proj rule, where for any
researcher r, projr(ψ
∗) is the sum of the VQR scores of the products allocated to r in ψ∗,
i.e., projr(ψ
∗) =
∑
p∈ψ∗(r) scoreVQR(p). For instance, in the setting of Example 2.2, we
have that projr1(ψ
∗) = 25 and projr2(ψ
∗) = 26. In fact, on the one hand, this approach
trivially satisfies a desirable property of division rules.
(P1) “budget-balance”: A division rule γ must completely distribute the VQR score of
R over all its members, i.e.,
∑
r∈R γr(ψ
∗) = scoreVQR(R).
However, on the other hand, proj might lead to scenarios where some researcher (and
in turn some substructure) may have some reasonable argument against her/his structure
because of possible alternative allocations where that researcher may get a higher score.
Indeed, proj does not satisfy the following:
(P2) “fairness”: A division rule γ should assign to each researcher the best score among
all possible allocations, i.e., for each r ∈ R, γr(ψ
∗) ≥ γr(ψˆ), for any allocation ψˆ.
Example 2.3. Consider again the optimal allocation ψ∗ depicted in Figure 1(II), and com-
pare it with the allocation ψˆ∗ of Figure 1(III). Note that ψˆ∗ is another optimal allocation.
Moreover, it is easily seen that projr1(ψ
∗) = 25, whereas projr1(ψˆ
∗) = 26. Thus, r1 would
complain with her/his structure, if ψ∗ is selected in place of ψˆ∗. ✁
In fact, to design a division rule satisfying the above (rather strong) fairness criterium
is not straightforward. Indeed, property (P2) basically tells us that there must be exactly
one possible way to distribute the score scoreVQR(R) over the members of R, independently
of the optimal allocation being actually selected. Of course, difficulties emerge in those
cases where products have multiple co-authors. Thus, to address this issue, one may find
natural to consider and analyze the following two division rules:
owner: assign to each author the sum of the “normalized” scores of the submitted prod-
ucts (s)he has co-authored, where by normalization we just mean here dividing the
score of any product by the number of its authors. For instance, in the setting of
Example 2.2, we have that, in the optimal allocation ψ∗ of Figure 1(II), half of the
score associated with p4 (equivalently, p5) is given to r1, and the remaining half to r2.
However, even this attempt of having a fair division rule is unsuccessful: The setting
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of Example 2.3 already evidences that this approach does not satisfy property (P2):
just check that ownerr2(ψ
∗) = 26 while ownerr2(ψˆ
∗) = 33. Indeed, according to this
division rule, the score of each researcher depends on the number of publications (s)he
has coauthored and R has submitted to ANVUR, which may be very different in the
various allocations.
all: distribute the score scoreVQR(R) to the members of R proportionally to their overall
production, and not just on the basis of the submitted publications. Accordingly, for
any researcher r ∈ R, we define
allr(ψ
∗) =
∑
p∈products(r) scorer(p)∑
r∈R
∑
p∈products(r) scorer(p)
×
∑
p∈ψ∗(r)
scoreVQR(p).
In fact, note that all satisfies property (P2), precisely because the division does not
depend on the specific products being selected and submitted to ANVUR.
Actually, we point out here that, while being conceptually simple and still satisfying the
fairness requirement, all would be hardly implementable in practice. First, under all, it is
clear that researchers might want to act strategically and overestimate the quality of their
own products. Second, even if all is adjusted in a way that it would be always convenient
for each researcher to be truthful, we believe that such a theoretical guarantee would still
not suffice to create a consensus on the division rule, given that it strongly depends (also)
on scores that are not certified by ANVUR. Thus, the specific application scenario we are
considering suggests the following additional requirement, which is not satisfied by all:
(P3) “implementability”: A division rule γ must be indifferent w.r.t. the scores (possibly
cheats) declared for unverified products, that is, for products not occurring in the
selected allocation.
So far, none of the proposed examples of division rules emerged to be acceptable. Moreover,
in our discussion, we have anticipated another crucial requirement for a division rule, which
is truthfulness. Indeed, depending on the specific division rule being selected, co-authors
may be competitors and might want to act strategically to improve their own score. In
particular, while it is clear in principle that the total value of the products should be
maximized (social welfare), authors’ personal interest may lead to choices going in a different
(non-optimal) direction. Thus, a division rule must prevent manipulation:
(P4) “truthfulness”: A division rule γ must provide no incentive in misreporting the
score of the research products.
Very recently, (perhaps) having recognized that the research programme might provide in-
centive to strategic behaviors, ANVUR pointed out that only aggregated information about
substructures will be made available, rather than the individual scores of the researchers.
However, note that this is not satisfying for two reasons.
First, it is clearly a waste of money to conduct such a thorough evaluation of the
quality of the Italian research, without then providing the output of the results for research
10
Figure 2: Strategic manipulations with the rule proj.
products. Indeed, this kind of information would be useful to define the part of the salary
of each researcher that is function of her/his productivity, according to the current law.3
This is so evident that many researchers still believe that such an information will be used
for their personal evaluation (soon or later), and thus are adopting strategic behaviors to
have allocated the best products (usually, under the assumption that the rule proj will be
used). However, this might not lead to the global optimum for their research structure,
because of possible poor performances of co-authors, as we shall see in the example below.
Second, disclosing only aggregated information does not prevent at all the emergence
of strategic behaviors. Indeed, such strategic issues still emerge as soon as two researchers
from different substructures co-authored some research product, with each of them being
interested in providing as much as contribution as possible to her/his own substructure.
Again, this might not lead to the global optimum, as we next exemplify for the rule proj.
Example 2.4. Assume that r1 and r2 belong to different substructures. Consider the
rule proj, and assume that researcher r1 declares that her/his products p2 and p3 are of
poor quality (e.g., scorer1(p2) = scorer1(p3) = 2), as it is illustrated in Figure 2(I). Then, an
optimal allocation ψ∗p is the one shown in Figure 2(II), where the set {p1, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8} of
products is submitted to ANVUR. Assume that, for all these products, there is an agreement
between declared scores and ANVUR ones. It follows that projr1(ψ
∗
p) = 26. On the other
hand, recall that in the allocation ψ∗ of Figure 1(II), which has been computed based on
the declaration that scorer1(p2) = scorer1(p2) = 7, it holds that projr1(ψ
∗) = 25. Thus, r1
finds convenient to misreport the true scores of p2 and p3, and underestimate them. Note
however that the overall score of the structure R is still 51 and, in fact, ψ∗p coincides with
the optimal allocation ψˆ∗ depicted in Figure 1(III) and discussed in Example 2.3.
Then, consider a slight variation of the problem instance depicted in Figure 2 where the
actual value of product p7 is 6 (instead of 8). Then, the above egoistic behavior of agent
r1 also damages its research structure because it leads to a sub-optimal allocation. Indeed,
due to the low declared values for p2 and p3, product p7 is selected and allocated to r2 in
the unique (wrong) optimal allocation, whose total score is now 49 (instead of 51). ✁
Analogously, the emergence of strategic issues with the rule owner can be easily seen.
Example 2.5. Assume again that r1 and r2 belong to different substructures. Consider now
the rule owner, and assume that researcher r1 declares that scorer1(p2) = scorer1(p3) = 9.
Then, consider the optimal allocation ψ∗o shown in Figure 3(II), and note that, in this case,
the set {p1, p2, p3, p5, p7, p8} of products is submitted to ANVUR.
3. Actually, this applies only to tenured positions at Universities.
11
Figure 3: Strategic manipulations with the rule owner.
Now, assume that the VQR scores of these products are those illustrated in Figure 1(I),
i.e., the same ones as those discussed in Example 2.1. Thus, r1 has cheated with the aim of
overestimating the products of which (s)he is the sole author. In fact, this is convenient to
her/him, since according to the rule owner, r1 now gets ownerr1(ψ
∗
o) = 24 + 4, because of
the products in {p1, p2, p3} allocated to her/him (with overall score 24) and of the product
p5 co-authored with r2 (whose overall score is then shared with r2). On the other hand,
just recall that in the allocation ψ∗ of Figure 1(II), which has been computed based on the
“truthful” declaration that scorer1(p2) = scorer1(p3) = 7, it holds that ownerr1(ψ
∗) = 25.
It follows that r1 finds convenient to cheat under owner, in order to increment the number of
products submitted to the VQR that (s)he has coauthored. However, the egoistic behavior
of agent r1 again damages its research structure, as we now have that the total VQR score
is 50 (instead of 51)—see again Figure 3(II). ✁
As a matter of fact, the emergence of strategic issues across substructures risks to pe-
nalize, in the long term period, collaborations and cross-fertilizations.4 To prevent all these
problems, a truthful mechanism is of course definitively needed. In fact, as the above ex-
amples might have already suggested to the careful reader, truthfulness can be achieved by
exploiting the fact that ANVUR evaluation corresponds to a “verification ability” available
in the setting. For instance, one might punish (e.g., by assigning 0 as overall score) all
those researchers whose reported values are found different from the verified ones (usually
interpreted as “lying agents”), as it is in the spirit of most of the literature on mechanisms
with verification (see, e.g., Auletta et al., 2009; Penna & Ventre, 2009; Krysta & Ventre,
2010; Ferrante et al., 2009; Caragiannis et al., 2012). Indeed, under the intimidation of
a punishment, any (reasonable) division rule can be turned into a truthful one. However,
in the application scenario we are considering, a punishment approach would be hardly
“politically” acceptable—just think that a number of researchers have already announced
that they will not participate to the VQR program because they disagree with some of the
evaluation criteria made available by ANVUR, which are in fact perceived as imposed by
“law” rather than as being the outcome of a public discussion on the subject. Moreover,
charging researchers because of some discrepancy between their self-evaluation about some
paper and the one by ANVUR experts would require some convincing proof of their ma-
licious behavior. Therefore, any punishing approach would be quite hard to implement in
practice, for this real-world case study. For this reason, we avoid this brute-force approach,
and ask that the following property holds.
4. It is not by chance that the authors of this paper belong to different substructures of the same University.
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(P5) “no punishment”: A division rule γ must be such that, for each r ∈ R and each
allocation ψ∗, the value γr(ψ
∗) is indifferent w.r.t. self-assessed scores, in particular,
w.r.t. discrepancies possibly emerging between such scores and VQR ones.
Note that, in the light of the above requirement, we look for a method to enforce truthfulness
where verification is used in a rather limited sense. Moreover, it is relevant to observe that
if the division rule is not well-designed, then cases might emerge where there is no way at
all to exploit verification (even in its strongest form where punishment is allowed).
Example 2.6. Consider again the use of the rule proj in Example 2.4, and recall that r1
finds convenient to underestimate the true scores of p2 and p3. However, since p2 and p3
does not occur in ψ∗p , as we can see in Figure 2(II), then there is no way to discover that r1
has actually cheated. Therefore, in this case, verification on the selected products provides
no-extra power, and truthfulness is not achieved. ✁
3. Fair Allocation Problems
By looking at the examples discussed in the above section, it emerges that defining a “good”
division rule is not an easy task in allocation problems with indivisible goods.
In this section, we provide the formal framework for studying such problems, based on
mechanism design tools. In particular, we focus on mechanisms equipped with a verification
ability, which meets the “no-punishment” perspective. To help the intuition, after notions
are defined in the formal framework, we discuss how they fit our running (motivating)
example about the Italian research assessment programme.
3.1 Formal Framework: Allocations and Strategic Setting
Assume that a universe U of indivisible goods is given. An allocation scenario over U is a
tuple S = 〈A, G, ω〉 where A = {1, ..., n} is a set of agents, G ⊆ U is a set of goods, and
ω : A 7→ N is a function associating each agent i ∈ A with a natural number ω(i) > 0.
An allocation for S is a function pi mapping each agent i ∈ A into a set pi(i) ⊆ G of
goods with |pi(i)| ≤ ω(i) and such that pi(i) ∩ pi(j) = ∅, for each agent j 6= i. Note that
ω provides the upper bounds on the number of goods that can be allocated to agents. Of
course, this is more general than assuming that no bound is given, which is just the special
case ω(i) = |G|, for each agent i ∈ A. Eventually, note that goods cannot be shared. In the
following, we denote by dom(pi) the domain of pi, and by img(pi) the set of goods occurring
in the image of pi, that is,
⋃
i∈dom(pi) pi(i).
The type of an agent is a real-valued function over G, which is meant to express her/his
evaluation of each single good. A vector w = (w1, ..., wn) where wi : G 7→ R is the type of
agent i, for each i ∈ A, is called a type vector. The value of an allocation pi for S w.r.t. w,
denoted by val(pi,w), is given by
∑
i∈dom(pi) wi(pi). Then, pi is optimal (for S w.r.t. w) if
there is no allocation pi′ for S such that val(pi′,w) > val(pi,w). The value of an optimal
allocation for S w.r.t. w is denoted by opt(S,w), while the set of all optimal allocations
for S w.r.t. w is denoted by Π∗S,w, or simply by Π
∗
w if S is understood from the context.
For each agent i, let Di be the set of all her/his possible types, and letD be the Cartesian
product D1 × · · · ×Dn. Hereinafter, we assume that an allocation scenario S = 〈A, G, ω〉
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is given, together with two type vectors t = (t1, ..., tn) ∈ D and d = (d1, ..., dn) ∈ D. In
particular, we assume that each agent i reports a declared type di, which might be different
from her/his actual evaluation ti of the available goods, called the true type of i. Vector d
is public knowledge, while vector t is not, because type ti is private knowledge of agent i.
Allocation problems 7→ VQR. The motivating scenario discussed in Section 2 is a special
case of the above general framework. Indeed, we can associate each structure R with an
allocation scenario SR = 〈A, G,3〉, where A is the set of researchers affiliated to R, G
is the set of their products, and 3 : A 7→ {3} is the constant function stating that each
researcher can submit 3 products at most. In this setting, d encodes the scores declared
by the researchers (with the negative score −1 being conventionally assigned by di to the
products that i declares not to have authored). This correspondence is exemplified below.
Example 3.1. Consider again the setting of Example 2.5. The given research structure R
can be modeled as the allocation scenario 〈{r1, r2}, {p1, ..., p8},3〉. Moreover, the vector d
is such that, for each i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, ..., 8}: dri(pj) = scoreri(pj), if pj ∈ products(ri),
and dri(pj) = −1, otherwise. Note that Figure 3(I) can be viewed as a graphical repre-
sentation of 〈{r1, r2}, {p1, ..., p8},3〉 where negative edges are omitted. For instance, for
researcher r1, we have dr1(p1) = 10, dr1(p2) = 9, dr1(p7) = −1, and so on. Clearly, optimal
allocations for the research assessment problem one-to-one correspond to optimal ones for
the corresponding allocation scenario w.r.t. d. For instance, the allocation ψ∗o in Figure 3(II)
is an optimal allocation for 〈{r1, r2}, {p1, ..., p8},3〉 w.r.t. d. ✁
Concerning the vector t of true types in the VQR setting, recall that research products
are evaluated by ANVUR according to some publicly available criteria, and that, having
such criteria, every author is expected to be able of self-evaluating her/his own products in
a way consistent with ANVUR evaluation. Thus, the vector t encodes the “true score” of
each product, as it can be determined according to ANVUR evaluation criteria.
Actually, note that in the case of the VQR setting, different researchers cannot have
truly different true types w.r.t. a product they have co-authored, because we are assuming
that true types coincide with ANVUR evaluations and ANVUR provides just one value
for each product. More formally, in any VQR allocation problem 〈A, G,3〉, the underlying
vector t of true types is such that ti(g) > 0 and tj(g) > 0 implies that ti(g) = tj(g), for each
good g ∈ G and pair of agents i, j ∈ A. Of course, since the proposed framework is more
general, it may well support possible extensions of the current VQR setting tailored to a
finer-grained analysis of interdisciplinary products. Indeed, for such products, co-authors
can actually have different valuations for the same paper (e.g., for they belong to scientific
communities with a different research focus) and, therefore, it makes sense to have the
product reviewed by a different panel of experts for each author/area of interest.
3.2 Mechanisms with Verification
Throughout the paper, we consider mechanism design in a setting where a third-party,
called the verifier, is formalized as a function v associating any allocation pi with a vector
v(pi) = (v1, ..., vn) of verified types, with vi : img(pi) 7→ R, for each agent i ∈ A. In
particular we assume that, for each agent i ∈ A and good g ∈ img(pi), vi(g) = ti(g). Note
that a verifier is always able to precisely determine the real value (agents’ type) ti(g) of
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any good g in img(pi), i.e., of any good allocated to some agent by pi. Thus, in our setting,
values for allocated products can be fully verified. Instead, vi is undefined over values that
are not allocated, and hence not verified.
In order to encourage agents to truthfully report their private types, we shall design
mechanisms where monetary transfers can be performed, after verified types are available.
Formally, a payment rule p = (p1, ..., pn) is defined as a vector of functions, with pi(pi,d)
being some amount of money that is given to agent i, on the basis of an allocation pi and
a vector d. Observe that, with this notation, any negative value pi(pi,d) means that some
amount of money is charged to agent i. Then, i’s (quasi-linear) utility under p, sometimes
called individual welfare, is defined as ui,p(pi,d) = vi(pi) + pi(pi,d). Whenever the payment
rule is easily understood from the context, i’s utility is simply denoted as ui(pi,d). Note
that utilities depend on verified types, as in the setting by Nisan and Ronen (2001). In fact,
we could have equivalently stated them in terms of the true types. However, the proposed
formulation best reflects the intended meaning of the framework, where payments—and
hence utilities—depend on the verification process rather than on personal beliefs of agents.
An allocation algorithm is a function A : D 7→ Π mapping each vector w ∈ D into an
allocation A(w). We say that the algorithm A is optimal if A(w) ∈ Π∗w, for each w ∈ D.
A mechanism with verification is a pair (A,p), where A is an allocation algorithm and
p is a payment rule that can exploit the power of a verifier v. The mechanism (A,p) can be
viewed as consisting of the following two-phases: First, agents report a declaration vector
d, and an allocation pi = A(d) is computed, by using some allocation algorithm A. Second,
the true types “restricted” over img(A(d)) are revealed, i.e., v(pi) is made available, and
payments under a given rule p are calculated for A(d) and d, by exploiting the knowledge of
v(pi). Intuitively, our goal is to design a payment rule p guaranteeing that declared types in
d induce an allocation A(d) maximizing the social welfare, i.e., such that A(d) ∈ Π∗t holds.
A comparison of our approach to verification with existing ones is reported in Section 7.
Allocation problems 7→ VQR. In the VQR setting, we have already pointed out that
ANVUR precisely plays the role of a verifier. For instance, by considering again Example 2.5,
we have that the set {p1, p2, p3, p5, p7, p8} is submitted to ANVUR and hence, for instance,
vr1(p1) = tr1(p1), because product p1 of r1 has been verified and hence r1’s evaluation about
it has been disclosed—see also Figure 3(II). Moreover, negative values model the types of
researchers for products that cannot be assigned to them. E.g., we have vr1(p8) = tr1(p8) =
−1, because r1 is not an author of p8, which is always trivially checked by the mechanism
(note that the specific negative value is immaterial).
Our goal is then to single out a mechanism with verification that uses appropriate
“monetary” transfers to compensate the (globally) optimal allocation of the given indivisible
goods. In particular, note that, in order to be consistent with the quasi-linear setting,
payments in the VQR setting have to be intended as redistributions of the VQR overall
score scoreVQR(R). As a result, the role of a division rule is now to determine the individual
welfare ui(pi,d) associated with each researcher/agent i. In fact, payment rules should
guarantee that welfare values satisfy a number of desirable properties, in particular, the
relevant ones pointed out in Section 2.
As a further remark, note that our choice of making the dependence on verified types
explicit in the definition of the utility function is conceptually clearer than assuming a
dependence on true types (in fact, eventually coinciding with verified ones). Indeed, our
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choice is adherent to the VQR setting, where funds (the actual utility of each researcher)
will be determined according to ANVUR evaluations.
3.3 Properties of Mechanisms
For any vector w = (w1, ..., wn) ∈ D of types (declarations) and for any type w¯i ∈ Di, we
denote by (w¯i,w−i) the type vector (w1, ..., wi−1, w¯i, wi+1, ..., wn) ∈ D.
Let (A,p) be a mechanism with verification, and let i by any agent in A and di her/his
declared type. We say that di is a dominant strategy of agent i w.r.t. (A,p) if, for each
vector w ∈ D, ui(A(di,w−i), (di,w−i)) ≥ ui(A(w),w) holds.
The mechanism (A,p) is truthful if, for each i ∈ A, ti is a dominant strategy. This is
in fact property (P4) in Section 2. Let (A,p) be any truthful mechanism. In the paper,
we will also focus on the following standard (ex-post) properties of such a mechanism, to
be checked at the equilibrium t where agents truthfully report their private types:
✄ efficiency : A(t) ∈ Π∗t. That is, the social welfare is maximized.
✄ individual rationality : ui(A(t), t) ≥ 0, for each agent i ∈ A. Hence, voluntary participa-
tion is encouraged.
✄ (strong) budget-balance:
∑
i∈A pi(A(t), t) = 0. In other words, there is no transfer of
money out of or into the mechanism. This is in fact property (P1).
✄ envy-freeness: for each pair of agents i, j ∈ A, and for each allocation pi such that
pi(i) = A(t)(j), ui(A(t), t) ≥ ui(pi, t).
✄ Pareto-efficiency : there is no allocation pi such that: (1) ui(A(t), t) ≤ ui(pi, t), for each
agent i ∈ A, and (2) there is an agent j ∈ A with uj(A(t), t) < uj(pi, t). That is, A(t) is
not Pareto-dominated by any other allocation.
Note that envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency are two direct consequences of the much
stronger property (P2), which can now be formalized as follows:
✄ fairness: ui(A(t), t) ≥ ui(pi, t), for each agent i ∈ A and for each allocation pi.
The two remaining properties (P3) and (P5) from the list in Section 2 (“implementabil-
ity” and “no punishment”, respectively) will be considered as well. Note that these prop-
erties must hold in general, i.e, not only at the equilibrium. In fact, in the more general
setting of allocation problems, they can be respectively formalized as follows:
✄ implementability : pi(pi,w) = pi(pi,w
′), for each agent i ∈ A, for each allocation pi,
and for each pair w,w′ ∈ D of vectors that that may differ only outside img(pi), i.e.,
wj(g) = w
′
j(g), for each j ∈ A and g ∈ img(pi). That is, goods that are not allocated
and hence not verified do not play any role in payments.
✄ no punishment: pi(pi,w) = pi(pi, (ti,w−i)), for each agent i ∈ A, for each allocation pi,
and for each type vector w ∈ D. That is, the payment function for agent i does not
depend on her/his declared values, so that possible discrepancies with the verified type
ti do not affect i’s payment according to the given allocation. In other words, we may
think of payments being always computed under the presumption of innocence, where
incorrect declared values do not necessarily mean manipulation attempts by the agents.
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Figure 4: One-good version of the allocation problem in Example 4.1, with two allocations
and their associated update graph, as defined in the proof of Theorem 4.4.
4. Mechanisms with Verification for Allocation Problems
In this section, we introduce a mechanism with verification for allocation problems and start
its analysis, by preliminary evidencing some properties that hold over optimal allocations.
4.1 General Properties of Allocation Problems
We first observe that the optimization problem used to allocate goods to agents can be
equivalently reformulated in such a way that at most one good can be allocated to each
agent. Intuitively, we may replace each agent i by ω(i) fresh agents with the same properties
as i. We remark that such an equivalence is just used for the combinatorial optimization
phase, i.e., without taking into account any (game theoretic) incentive consideration.
Let S = 〈A, G, ω〉 be an allocation problem. We denote by S1 its one-good version
〈A1, G,1〉, where A1 is the set of agents
⋃
i∈A clones(i) such that for each agent i ∈ A,
clones(i) is a set of ω(i) fresh agents, and where 1 is the constant function mapping each
agent to 1. For any vector w mapping each agent in A to her/his type, let w1 be the type
vector for agents in A1 such that w1c = wi, for each i ∈ A and c ∈ clones(i). Thus, in the
allocation problem S1 and considering the type vector w1 each “clone” c ∈ clones(i) can
get at most one good, and it has the same valuations as agent i in w.
Example 4.1. Consider again the ANVUR scenario discussed in Example 2.5 and il-
lustrated in Figure 3. Recall from Example 3.1 the associated allocation problem SR =
〈R, {p1, ..., p8},3〉, with R = {r1, r2}. Moreover, recall that the vector d of declared types
is such that, for each i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, ..., 8}: dri(pj) = scoreri(pj), if pj ∈ products(ri),
and dri(pj) = −1, otherwise. Its one-good version S
1
R is shown Figure 4(I), where the set of
agents is {(r1)1, (r1)2, (r1)3, (r2)1, (r2)2, (r2)3} and where we have that d
1
(r1)h
= dr1 (resp.,
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d1(r2)h = dr2), for each h ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In this graphical representation, crossing lines represent
the edges of the bipartite cliques connecting the two groups of virtual researchers with their
products, while, as usual, edges with negative scores (valuations for products owned only
by other authors) are omitted. ✁
For any set C ⊆ A of agents and set G′ ⊆ G of goods, the tuple 〈C, G′, ω〉 is the
restriction of 〈A, G, ω〉 where only agents in C and goods in G′ are considered.5 Consider
such a scenario 〈C, G′, ω〉 and let pi1C be an allocation for its one-good version 〈C, G
′, ω〉1.
Note that pi1C induces the allocation piC(i) =
⋃
c∈clones(i) pi
1
C(c) for 〈C, G
′, ω〉, denoted by
ω-good(pi1C ). By construction, val(piC ,w) = val(pi
1
C ,w
1). Conversely, any allocation p¯iC for
〈C, G′, ω〉 is associated with the non-empty set one-good(p¯iC) of all those allocations p¯i
1
C such
that p¯iC = ω-good(p¯i
1
C ), also called the one-good forms of p¯iC .
Fact 4.2. Let S be an allocation problem, let S1 be its one-good version, and let pi1C be
an allocation for S1. Then, pi1C is an optimal allocation for S
1 w.r.t. w1 if, and only if,
ω-good(pi1C ) is an optimal allocation for S w.r.t. w.
Example 4.3. Consider again the setting of Example 4.1, and the optimal allocation
ψ∗o shown in Figure 3(II). Then, it is immediate to check that the allocation depicted in
Figure 4(II) is indeed an associated one-good form allocation, which is actually an optimal
allocation for 〈R, {p1, ..., p8},3〉
1 w.r.t. d1, by Fact 4.2. ✁
We are now in the position of stating a property that holds on any optimal allocation pi.
The property is in fact of interest of its own, i.e., independently of its application to the
design of a mechanism with verification. In words, it tells us that, whenever we are interested
in allocating goods to any subset of agents, we may safely consider only goods in img(pi),
rather than the whole set G. In our case, it is a basic technical ingredient for showing a
number of key properties because, intuitively, it allows us to get rid of alternative (optimal)
allocations, possibly based on non-evaluated goods in G \ img(pi).
Theorem 4.4. Let pi be an optimal allocation for 〈A, G, ω〉 w.r.t. w, and let Gpi = img(pi) ⊆
G be the set of goods allocated according to pi. Then, for each set of agents C ⊆ A, every
optimal allocation for 〈C, Gpi, ω〉 w.r.t. w is an optimal allocation for 〈C, G, ω〉 w.r.t. w.
Proof. Let C ⊆ A be any set of agents, and let ηC be any optimal allocation for 〈C, Gpi, ω〉
w.r.t. w, where Gpi = img(pi). We show that ηC is an optimal allocation for the unrestricted
problem 〈C, G, ω〉 w.r.t. w, too.
To this end, consider any optimal allocation λC for the problem 〈C, G, ω〉 where all
goods in G are available to the agents in C. We next prove that val(ηC ,w) = val(λC ,w).
This clearly follows from the optimality of ηC if img(λC) ⊆ Gpi holds. Therefore, to be
strictly better than ηC , a function must allocate some good in G \ Gpi. Assume thus by
contradiction that val(ηC ,w) < val(λC ,w), and hence img(λC) 6⊆ Gpi, which entails that
Gpi ⊂ G. Consider two allocations η
1
C ∈ one-good(ηC) and λ
1
C ∈ one-good(λC), and observe
first that: val(η1C ,w
1) = val(ηC ,w) < val(λC ,w) = val(λ
1
C ,w
1).
5. Note the little abuse of notation: the function ω in 〈C, G′, ω〉 should be in fact its restriction over C.
However, to keep the notation simple, we just write ω, as no confusion may arise. Similarly, any type
vector w for A will be transparently considered as a type vector for any subset of agents C ⊆ A—we
just get rid of the unused components associated with agents in A \ C.
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Let S be the set of agents whose good-assignment are the same according to these
allocations, i.e., S = {c ∈ C1 | λ1C(c) = η
1
C (c)}. Then, define ∆(η
1
C , λ
1
C) = (C
1 \ S ∪ {s, t}, E)
to be the directed graph, called update graph for η1C w.r.t. λ
1
C , whose nodes are the agents
in C1 that change their goods in the two allocations plus two distinguished nodes s and t,
and whose edges in E are defined as follows:
− There is an edge from agent c to agent c′ if λ1C(c
′) = η1C (c) 6= ∅;
− There is an edge from s to agent c′ if there is no agent c such that λ1C(c
′) = η1C (c) 6= ∅;
− There is an edge from agent c to t if there is no agent c′ such that λ1C(c
′) = η1C (c) 6= ∅;
− No further edges are in E.
For an example construction, consider Figure 4(IV) showing the update graph for the allo-
cation shown in Figure 4(II) w.r.t. the allocation shown in Figure 4(III).
As each agent gets at most one good in η1C and λ
1
C , each node in ∆(η
1
C , λ
1
C) but s and t
has exactly one incoming edge and one outgoing edge. Moreover, by construction, s has no
incoming edge, and t has no outgoing edge. Thus, the update graph consists of a number
of paths from s to t and a number of cycles, all of them being disjoint from each other.
Let {τ1, ..., τh} be the set of all possible paths from s to t or cycles in ∆(η
1
C , λ
1
C), and for
a path or a cycle τi = α1, ..., αm, let agents(τi) be the set {α1, ..., αm} \ {s, t}. In addition,
let us fix the following notation: For any function pi′ : A′ 7→ G′, let pi′[A′] denote the
restriction of pi′ over A′ ⊆ A. Moreover, for the functions pi1 : A1 7→ G1 and pi2 : A2 7→ G2
with A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, let pi1
⊎
pi2 : A1 ∪ A2 7→ G1 ∪ G2 be such that (pi1
⊎
pi2)[A1] = pi1 and
(pi1
⊎
pi2)[A2] = pi2.
By the construction of the update graph, note that λ1C can be expressed in terms of the
disjoint paths/cycles τ1, ..., τh by the following expression:
η1C [C
1 \
h⋃
i=1
agents(τi)]
h⊎
i=1
λ1C [agents(τi)].
Because val(η1C ,w
1) < val(λ1C ,w
1), there must exists a set of agents agents(τk), associated
with some disjoint path/cycle τk, with 1 ≤ k ≤ h, such that the value of the goods allocated
to these agents according to λ1C is greater than the corresponding value for the same agents
obtained after η1C . That is, the function piτk = η
1
C [C
1 \ agents(τk)]
⊎
λ1C [agents(τk)], which
is an allocation for 〈C, G, ω〉1, is such that val(piτk ,w
1) > val(η1C ,w
1). Note that if τk were
a cycle or a path of the form s, α2, . . . , αm−1, t such that λ
1
C(α2) ⊆ Gpi, then img(piτk) ⊆ Gpi
would hold. Indeed, only the first node in a path, such as α2, may be such that λ
1
C(α2)\Gpi 6=
∅. However, as observed above, this is impossible because val(piτk ,w
1) > val(η1C ,w
1) would
contradict the optimality of η1C , and hence the optimality of ηC , by Fact 4.2.
Therefore, we can conclude that τk is a path of the form s, α2, . . . , αm−1, t with piτk(α2) =
λ(α2) = {g
′} ∈ G \ Gpi. That is, the allocation piτk (over the agents in C
1) is such that
img(piτk) = {g
′}∪img(η1C )\η
1
C (αm−1). In particular, observe that η
1
C (αm−1) ⊆ Gpi\img(piτk).
Let us now come back to the optimal allocation pi for 〈A, G, ω〉 w.r.t. w, and let pi1
be an (optimal) allocation in one-good(pi). Let A ⊆ C1 be a set of agents with α2 ∈ A
such that the set of goods
⋃
c∈A pi
1(c) allocated to these agents according to pi1 is equal to⋃
c∈A piτk(c) \ {g
′} ∪G′′, where G′′ ⊆ Gpi \ img(piτk) and |G
′′| ≤ 1. Note that a set A having
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Input: An allocation pi for 〈A, G, ω〉, and a vector w ∈ D;
Assumption: A verifier v is available. Let v(pi) = (v1, ..., vn);
1. Let C denote the set of all possible subsets of A;
2. For each set C ∈ C,
3. ⌊ Compute an optimal allocation piC for 〈C, img(pi), ω〉 w.r.t. w;
4. For each agent i ∈ A,
5. | For each set C ∈ C,
6. | | Let ∆1C,i(pi,w) := val(piC , (vi,w−i)); (=vi(piC) +
∑
j∈C\{i} wj(piC));
7. | ⌊ Let ∆2C,i(pi,w) := val(piC\{i},w); (=
∑
j∈C\{i}wj(piC\{i}));
8. | Let ξi(pi,w) :=
∑
C∈C
(|A|−|C|)!(|C|−1)!
|A|! (∆
1
C,i(pi,w)−∆
2
C,i(pi,w));
9. ⌊ Define pξi (pi,w) := ξi(pi,w)− vi(pi);
Figure 5: Payment rule pξ.
this property in fact exists: just start with {α2} and then add agents from agents(τk) until
some c is found with pi1(c) ⊆ Gpi \ img(piτk).
Consider then p¯i = piτk [A]
⊎
pi1[A1 \ A] and note that p¯i is indeed an allocation for
〈A, G, ω〉1, because the construction of the set A guarantees that no good allocated ac-
cording to piτk [A] can be allocated by pi
1 to agents in [A1 \ A], and vice-versa. Since pi1 is
an optimal allocation for 〈A, G, ω〉1 w.r.t. w1, val(pi1,w1) ≥ val(p¯i,w1) holds. Thus, by
construction of p¯i, we get val(pi1[A],w1) ≥ val(p¯i[A],w1) = val(piτk [A],w
1).
Finally, let p¯i′C = piτk [C
1 \ A]
⊎
pi1[A] and note that p¯i′C is an allocation for 〈C, G, ω,w〉
1.
Moreover, observe that val(p¯i′C ,w
1) ≥ val(piτk ,w
1) > val(η1C ) and img(p¯i
′
C) ⊆ Gpi. For this
latter, just recall that α2 ∈ A is the only agent in C
1 such that piτk(α2) \ Gpi 6= ∅. Again,
this entails that η1C is not optimal w.r.t. w
1 and hence by Fact 4.2 ηC is also not optimal
for 〈C, Gpi , ω〉 w.r.t. w. Contradiction.
The result immediately entails the following two corollaries.
Corollary 4.5. For each optimal allocation pi for 〈A, G, ω〉 w.r.t. w and for each set C ⊆ A
of agents, opt(〈C, img(pi), ω〉,w) = opt(〈C, G, ω〉,w).
Corollary 4.6. Let pi be an optimal allocation for 〈A, G, ω〉 w.r.t. w, and let pi′ be any
allocation for 〈A, G, ω〉, hence with val(pi,w) ≥ val(pi′,w). Then, for each set C ⊆ A of
agents, opt(〈C, img(pi), ω〉,w) ≥ opt(〈C, img(pi′), ω〉,w).
4.2 The Design of a Truthful Mechanism
With the above notation and results in place, we can now discuss the payment rule pξ that
is illustrated in Figure 5: We are given an allocation pi that selects some goods img(pi) ⊆ G
for the agents in A, plus a vector w ∈ D. Moreover, we assume the existence of a verifier
computing the vector v(pi) = (v1, ..., vn).
In the first three steps, the payment rule associates an optimal allocation piC for
〈C, img(pi), ω〉 w.r.t. w with each set C ∈ C of agents, where C is the powerset of A, i.e.,
the set of all possible subsets of agents. Then, for each agent i ∈ A and for each set C ∈ C,
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we define two terms, namely ∆1C,i(pi,w) and ∆
2
C,i(pi,w), which evaluate the allocations piC
and piC\{i} under the assumption that agent types are (vi,w−i) and w, respectively. These
terms will play a role in the definition of the value ξi(pi,w) at step 8. In particular, we
observe that the definition of this value is reminiscent of the definition of the Shapley value,
as it considers the marginal contribution of each possible set C summed up in a weighted
manner w.r.t. its size.6 Finally, the payment pξi (pi,w) is defined at step 9 as the difference
between ξi(pi,w) and vi(pi).
Note that the idea underlying the definition of pξ is that, after verification is performed,
the utility function will precisely coincide with the “bonus” ξi(pi,w), hence sharing the
spirit7 of the approach by Nisan and Ronen (2001). Indeed, the following is immediate.
Lemma 4.7. For each allocation pi for 〈A, G, ω〉, for each vector w ∈ D, and for each
agent i ∈ A, it holds that ui(pi,w) = ξi(pi,w).
By exploiting this characterization, we can now show the first crucial result on the pay-
ment rule pξ, i.e., that the mechanism (A,pξ)—where A is any arbitrary optimal allocation
algorithm—is truthful.
Theorem 4.8 (truthfulness). Let A be any optimal allocation algorithm. Then, the mech-
anism with verification (A,pξ) is truthful.
Proof. We have to show that, for each agent i ∈ A, and reported type vector d,
the following holds: ui(A(ti,d−i), (ti,d−i)) ≥ ui(A(d),d); hence, by Lemma 4.7, that
ξi(A(ti,d−i), (ti,d−i)) ≥ ξi(A(d),d).
Consider the construction reported in Figure 5 for the two cases of w = d and w =
(ti,d−i), and let pi = A(d) and pi
′ = A(ti,d−i) be the corresponding allocations (optimal
w.r.t. d and (ti,d−i), respectively) received as input by the payment rule in Figure 5. For
any set C ∈ C of agents, let piC (resp., pi
′
C) be the allocation computed at step 3. We show
that the following two properties hold, for each set of agents C ∈ C:
(A) ∆1C,i(pi
′, (ti,d−i)) ≥ ∆
1
C,i(pi, (bi,d−i)), and
(B) ∆2C,i(pi
′, (ti,d−i)) = ∆
2
C,i(pi, (bi,d−i)).
In order to prove (A), observe that by step 6, ∆1C,i(pi
′, (ti,d−i)) = vi(pi
′
C) +∑
j∈C\{i} dj(pi
′
C) = ti(pi
′
C)+
∑
j∈C\{i} dj(pi
′
C), because in this case i reports the actual private
type ti, which is equal to the verified one. Now, recall that pi
′
C is an optimal allocation
for 〈C, img(pi′), ω〉 w.r.t. (ti,d−i), and pi
′ = A(ti,d−i) is an optimal allocation for 〈A, G, ω〉
w.r.t. (ti,d−i). Thus, by Corollary 4.5,
ti(pi
′
C) +
∑
j∈C\{i}
dj(pi
′
C) = val(pi
′
C , (ti,d−i)) = opt(〈C, G, ω〉, (ti ,d−i)). (1)
Similarly, ∆1C,i(pi, (bi,d−i)) = vi(piC) +
∑
j∈C\{i} dj(piC). In this case, observe that the re-
ported type of i is bi, which is different from ti. Also, piC is an allocation for 〈C, img(pi), ω〉,
6. The reader that is not familiar with this solution concept is referred to the introductory part of Section 5,
where the Shapley value is formally defined.
7. In fact, the peculiar form of ξi(pi,w) does not fit the general schema by Nisan and Ronen (2001).
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hence it allocates goods in img(pi), for which the true type is revealed in v(pi). Thus, we
may compute ∆1C,i(pi, (bi,d−i)) = vi(piC) +
∑
j∈C\{i} dj(piC) = ti(piC) +
∑
j∈C\{i} dj(piC).
In order to conclude, let us note that piC is an allocation for 〈C, G, ω〉, though it is not
necessarily optimal w.r.t. (ti,d−i). Thus, by using Equation 1, ti(pi
′
C) +
∑
j∈C\{i} dj(pi
′
C) =
opt(〈C, G, ω〉, (ti,d−i)) ≥ ti(piC) +
∑
j∈C\{i} dj(piC). This shows that (A) holds.
Let us now focus on (B). By step 7, we preliminary observe that we have
∆2C,i(pi
′, (ti,d−i)) =
∑
j∈C\{i} dj(pi
′
C\{i}) and ∆
2
C,i(pi, (bi,d−i)) =
∑
j∈C\{i} dj(piC\{i}). Then,
recall that piC\{i} is an optimal allocation for 〈C \ {i}, img(pi), ω〉 w.r.t. (ti,d−i) and
pi = A(bi,d−i) is an optimal allocation for 〈A, G, ω〉 w.r.t. (bi,d−i). Thus, by Corollary 4.5,
and because i’s evaluation is immaterial here, we get (B) as follows:
∑
j∈C\{i} dj(pi
′
C\{i}) =
opt(〈C \ {i}, G, ω〉, (ti,d−i)) = opt(〈C \ {i}, G, ω〉, (bi,d−i)) =
∑
j∈C\{i} dj(piC\{i}).
In addition to truthfulness, it suddenly emerges that the payment rule is indifferent
w.r.t. deviations from the actual values (possibly, cheats) on goods that do not occur in the
allocation being selected. We have already observed that this property is relevant in our
motivating scenario, where payments should be made only with respect to certified goods
(as evaluated by a third-party agency). Now, we state it in formal terms.
Theorem 4.9 (implementability). For each allocation pi for 〈A, G, ω〉 and for each agent
i ∈ A, it holds that pξi (pi,w) = p
ξ
i (pi,w
′), for each pair w,w′ ∈ D of vectors that differ only
outside img(pi).
Proof. It suffices to observe that, in the algorithm in Figure 5, optimal allocations are
restricted over the set img(pi) at step 3. Thus, the payment rule is completely indifferent
w.r.t. agents’ evaluations of the goods outside img(pi).
Moreover, it can be noticed that payments do not depend on possible discrepancies
between declared and verified values, as shown below.
Theorem 4.10 (no punishment). For each agent i ∈ A, for each allocation pi for
〈A, G, ω〉, and for each type vector w ∈ D, it holds that pξi (pi,w) = p
ξ
i (pi, (ti,w−i)).
Proof. Recall that, in the algorithm in Figure 5, only goods in img(pi) are considered, and
observe that the payment for agent i depends only on her/his verified type, rather than on
the declared one.
4.3 Further Properties of Truthful Strategies
Let us now analyze some relevant properties that hold on whenever agents choose their
dominant strategy of truthfully reporting their private types. The first property is a useful
characterization for the utility of the agents.
Theorem 4.11. For each optimal allocation pi for 〈A, G, ω〉 w.r.t. t, and for each agent
i ∈ A, it holds that:
ui(pi, t) =
∑
C∈C
(|A| − |C|)!(|C| − 1)!
|A|!
(
opt(〈C, G, ω〉, t)− opt(〈C \ {i}, G, ω〉, t)
)
.
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Proof. By Lemma 4.7, we know that ui(pi, t) = ξi(pi, t). Then, for each set C ∈ C of agents,
and for each agent i ∈ A, consider the expressions ∆1C,i(pi, t) and ∆
2
C,i(pi, t) defined at step 6
and step 7, respectively, of the mechanism in Figure 5. Note that ∆1C,i(pi, t) = ti(piC) +∑
j∈C\{i} tj(piC) = val(piC) and ∆
2
C,i(pi, t) =
∑
j∈C\{i} tj(piC\{i}) = val(piC\{i}), where piC
and piC\{i} are optimal allocations for 〈C, img(pi), ω〉 w.r.t. t and for 〈C \ {i}, img(pi), ω〉
w.r.t. t, respectively. Thus, ∆1C,i(pi, t) = opt(〈C, img(pi), ω〉, t) and ∆
2
C,i(pi, t) = opt(〈C \
{i}, img(pi), ω〉, t). It follows that:
ui(pi, t) =
∑
C∈C
(|A| − |C|)!(|C| − 1)!
|A|!
(opt(〈C, img(pi), ω〉, t)− opt(〈C \ {i}, img(pi), ω〉, t)) . (2)
Recall now by Corollary 4.5 that, for each optimal allocation pi for 〈A, G, pi〉 w.r.t. w
and for each set C ∈ C of agents, opt(〈C, img(pi), ω〉,w) = opt(〈C, G, ω〉,w). Therefore,
∆1C,i(pi, t) = opt(〈C, G, ω〉, t) and ∆
2
C,i(pi, t) = opt(〈C \ {i}, G, ω〉, t). By using these equali-
ties, the result follows from Equation 2.
Note that in the above expression, agents’ utilities are completely independent of the
particular optimal allocation pi. Therefore, in every optimal allocation, every agent gets
precisely the same utility.
Corollary 4.12. Let pi and pi′ be two optimal allocations for 〈A, G, ω〉 w.r.t. t. Then,
ui(pi, t) = ui(pi
′, t) holds, for each i ∈ A.
Example 4.13. Consider the allocation scenario SR = 〈R, G,3〉, where G = {p1, ..., p8},
associated with the research structure R in Example 2.1. Assume that researchers declare
their true types t in the ANVUR evaluation, and consider the optimal allocation ψ∗ shown
in Figure 1(II). Then, we have:
ur1(ψ
∗, t) = 12(opt(〈{r1, r2}, G,3〉, t) − opt(〈{r2}, G,3〉, t))+
1
2(opt(〈{r1}, G,3〉, t) − opt(〈{}, G,3〉, t))+
1
2(opt(〈{r2}, G,3〉, t) − opt(〈{r2}, G,3〉, t) =
1
2(51− 26) +
1
2(26− 0) +
1
2(26 − 26) =
51
2 .
In particular, note that opt(〈{r1}, G, 3〉, t)) = 26, as we can allocate p1, p4, and p5 to
r1, if (s)he where the only researcher in the structure.
Similarly, we get ur2(ψ
∗, t) = 512 . That is, the two researchers will share precisely one
half of the total score of their structure, based on our payment scheme. In fact, by looking
at the allocation ψ∗ in Figure 1(II), one might na¨ıvely suppose that r2 contributed more
than r1. However, this is only due to the specific allocation considered, and not to the actual
values of the products of the two authors. For instance, p5 is allocated to r2 but it was
produced by r1, as well. Indeed, the fairness of the utility values resulting from our payment
rule suddenly appears when considering the alternative allocation ψˆ∗ in Figure 1(II), which
is symmetric w.r.t. ψ∗ and where it seems that r1 contributes more than r2: As a matter
of fact, the two researchers are completely interchangeable over optimal allocations, and
this is correctly reflected by our payment scheme. In particular, from Corollary 4.12, the
researchers are indifferent w.r.t. the specific optimal allocation being selected, and hence in
this case they equally divide all the available score between themselves. ✁
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We conclude by pointing out a further important property of the mechanism.
Corollary 4.14 (individual-rationality). Let A be any optimal allocation algorithm.
Then, the mechanism with verification (A,pξ) is individually-rational.
Proof. Notice that opt(〈C, G, ω〉, t) − opt(〈C \ {i}, G, ω〉, t) ≥ 0, holds for each C ⊆ A and
agent i ∈ A. Then, by Theorem 4.11, ui(pi, t) ≥ 0 holds, for each agent i ∈ A.
5. A Coalitional Game Theory Viewpoint
A coalitional game can be modeled as a pair G = 〈N,ϕ〉, where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite
set of agents, and ϕ is a function associating with each coalition C ⊆ N a real-value
ϕ(C) ∈ R, with ϕ({}) = 0, which is meant to encode the worth that agents in C obtain
by collaborating with each other. The function ϕ is supermodular (resp., submodular) if
ϕ(R ∪ T ) + ϕ(R ∩ T ) ≥ ϕ(R) + ϕ(T ) (resp., ϕ(R ∪ T ) + ϕ(R ∩ T ) ≤ ϕ(R) + ϕ(T )) holds,
for each pair of coalitions R,T ⊆ N .
A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single out the most desirable out-
comes, usually called solution concepts, in terms of appropriate notions of worth distribu-
tions, i.e., of vectors of payoffs x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ R
n such that
∑
i∈N xi = ϕ(N). This
question was studied in economics and game theory with the aim of providing arguments
and counterarguments about why such proposals are reasonable mathematical renderings
of the intuitive concepts of fairness and stability. For further background on coalitional
games, the reader is referred to, e.g., (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994).
Here, we consider the Shapley value of G = 〈N,ϕ〉, which is a well-known solution
concept such that:
φi(G) =
∑
C⊆N
(|N | − |C|)!(|C| − 1)!
|N |!
(ϕ(C) − ϕ(C \ {i})), for each i ∈ N.
Indeed, we shall show that the mechanism defined in Section 4 has a nice interpretation in
terms of the Shapley value of some suitable-defined coalitional games. The correspondence
will be exploited to prove further properties of our mechanism.
5.1 The Shapley Value of Allocation Games
We consider two coalitional games defined on top of an allocation problem.
Definition 5.1. Given the tuple S = 〈A, G, ω〉 and a vector w of agent types, we define
GmargS,w = 〈A, margS,w〉 and G
best
S,w = 〈A, bestS,w〉 as the coalitional games such, that for each
set C ⊆ A of agents,
• marg〈A,G,ω〉,w(C) = opt(S,w)− opt(〈A \ C, G, ω〉,w); and,
• bestS,w(C) = opt(〈C, G, ω〉,w). ✷
Note that margS,w(C) is themarginal contribution of C to opt(S,w). Instead, bestS,w(C)
is the best contribution of C (w.r.t. w), computed assuming that agents in C were the only
agents in the allocation problem. In particular, the game GbestS,w has already been considered
by Moulin (1992), precisely in the setting of fair division for allocation problems. There, it
is shown that the cost function associated with GbestS,w is submodular.
24
Proposition 5.2 (Moulin (1992)). The function bestS,w is submodular.
Then, the (dual) analogous for margS,w can be shown easily.
Theorem 5.3. The function margS,w is supermodular.
Proof. Let S = 〈A, G, ω〉 be the given structure, and w be a vector of types. The result
just follows by noticing that margS,w(C) = opt(〈A, G, ω〉,w) − opt(〈A \ C, G, ω〉,w) =
opt(〈A, G, ω〉,w) − bestS,w(A \ C), for each set of agents C ⊆ A. That is, bestS,w(C) =
opt(〈A, G, ω〉,w)−margS,w(A\C). Thus, if bestS,w(R∪T )+bestS,w(R∩T ) ≤ bestS,w(R)+
bestS,w(T ) holds ∀R,T ⊆ N , we have that margS,w(A\ (R∪T ))+ margS,w(A\ (R∩T )) ≥
margS,w(A\R)+margS,w(A\T ) holds as well, ∀R,T ⊆ N . Eventually, by letting R
′ = A\R
and T ′ = A\T , we get margS,w(R
′ ∩T ′)+ margS,w(R
′ ∪T ′)) ≥ margS,w(R
′)+ margS,w(T
′),
for each ∀R′, T ′ ⊆ N . That is, margS,w is supermodular.
As a second relevant property, we next observe that the payment rules in Section 4
coincide, at the equilibrium t where agents truthfully report their types, with the Shapley
value of the game GbestS,t associated with S. The result follows by comparing the utility
function as in Theorem 4.11 with the expression for the Shapley value of the coalitional
game GbestS,t . Moreover, we show that the same result can be established for the “dual” game
GmargS,t , so that the Shapley values of the two games are identical—for similar correspondences
between Shapley values of different games, see also the works by Maniquet (2003) and Kalai
and Samet (1983).
Theorem 5.4. For each optimal allocation pi for S = 〈A, G, ω〉 w.r.t. t, and for each agent
i ∈ A, it holds that ui(pi, t) = ξi(pi, t) = φi(G
best
S,t) = φi(G
marg
S,t ).
Proof. By comparing the utility function as in Theorem 4.11 with the expression for the
Shapley value of the coalitional game GbestS,t associating with each coalition C of agents the
worth opt(〈C, G, ω〉, t), we immediately get that, for each optimal allocation pi for S w.r.t. t,
and for each agent i ∈ A, it holds that ui(pi, t) = ξi(pi, t) = φi(G
best
S,t ).
In order to conclude the proof, we show that for each agent i ∈ A, φi(G
marg
S,t ) = φi(G
best
S,t )
holds. To this end, first note that these Shapley values can be written as follows:
− φi(G
marg
S,t ) =
∑
C⊆A,i∈C
(|A|−|C|)!(|C|−1)!
|A|! T
′
C , and
− φi(G
best
S,t) =
∑
C⊆A,i∈C
(|A|−|C|)!(|C|−1)!
|A|! TC ,
where T ′C = margS,t(C)− margS,t(C \{i}) and TC = opt(〈C, G, ω〉, t)− opt(〈C \ {i}, G, ω〉, t).
Then, we claim that:
(1) for each set C ⊆ A of agents with i ∈ C, the set C¯ = (A\C)∪{i} is such that T ′C = TC¯ ,
and
(2) for each set C¯ ⊆ A of agents with i ∈ C¯, the set C = (A\ C¯)∪{i} is such that T ′C = TC¯ .
(1) Let C ⊆ A such that i ∈ C, and observe that T ′C = margS,t(C) − margS,t(C \ {i}) =
(opt(S, t)− opt(〈A \C, G, ω〉, t))− (opt(S, t)− opt(〈A \ (C \ {i}), G, ω〉, t)) = opt(〈A \ (C \
25
{i}), G, ω〉, t) − opt(〈A \ C, G, ω〉, t) = opt(〈(A \ C) ∪ {i}), G, ω〉, t) − opt(〈A \ C, G, ω〉, t).
Thus, let C¯ = (A \ C) ∪ {i}, and note that T ′C = TC¯ .
(2) Let C¯ ⊆ A such that i ∈ C¯, and observe that TC¯ = opt(〈C¯, G, ω〉, t) − opt(〈C¯ \
{i}, G, ω〉, t) = (opt(S, t) − opt(〈C¯ \ {i}, G, ω〉, t)) − (opt(S, t) − opt(〈C¯, G, ω〉, t)) =
margS,t((A \ C¯) ∪ {i})− margS,t(A \ C¯). Thus, let C = (A \ C¯) ∪ {i} and note that T
′
C = TC¯ .
As (1) and (2) hold, and given the two expressions for φi(G
marg
S,t ) and φi(G
best
S,t), we conclude
that the two values coincide.
5.2 Fairness and Budget-Balancedness
Now that we have established a precise correspondence between our mechanism and the
Shapley value of its associated allocation games, we can show further desirable proper-
ties of pξ. In fact, we exploit the following well-known properties (see, e.g., Osborne &
Rubinstein, 1994; Young, 1985) of the Shapley value of any game G = 〈N,ϕ〉:
(I)
∑
i∈N φi(G) = ϕ(N);
(II) If ϕ is supermodular (resp., submodular), then
∑
i∈C φi(G) ≥ ϕ(C) (resp.,
∑
i∈C φi(G) ≤
ϕ(C)).
(III) If G′ = 〈N,ϕ′〉 is a game such that ϕ′(C) ≥ ϕ(C), for each C ⊆ N , then φi(G
′) ≥ φi(G),
for each agent i ∈ A.
Our first result is to show that bestS,t(C) and margS,t(C) provide an upper and a lower
bound, respectively, to the sum of the utility functions over any set C of agents. This is
particularly useful whenever we have to reason in terms of fairness for groups of agents,
rather than just in terms of the utility of singletons.
For instance, in the motivating scenario of Section 2, a crucial question concerns how
the structure funding after the ANVUR evaluation (e.g., the research funds for a Univer-
sity) should be shared among its sub-structures (e.g., the Departments). The result below
shows that, with our mechanism, any sub-structure will never get less than its marginal
contribution, neither more than the maximum contribution it can achieve if its members
were alone in the structure. In particular, any closed group of researchers (e.g., any depart-
ment without collaborations with other departments, or any research group without further
coauthors in the same structure) will share precisely the total value attributed by ANVUR
to its research products. Such a score is desirable for agents, and it is perceived as a fair
distribution (see the work by Moulin (1992), for more on the fairness of the Shapley value).
Theorem 5.5. Let pi be an optimal allocation for S = 〈A, G, ω〉 w.r.t. t. Then, for each
set C ⊆ A of agents, bestS,t(C) ≥
∑
i∈C ui(pi, t) ≥ margS,t(C).
Proof. By Theorem 5.4, we know that ui(pi, t) = φi(G
best
S,t) = φi(G
marg
S,t ), for each agent i ∈ A
and optimal allocation pi. Then, we can simply recall that the function margS,t (resp.,
bestS,t) associated with the game G
marg
S,t (resp., G
best
S,t) is supermodular (resp., submodu-
lar) by Theorem 5.3 (resp., Proposition 5.2). Hence, the result follows as
∑
i∈C ui(pi, t) =∑
i∈C φi(G
best
S,t) =
∑
i∈C φi(G
marg
S,t ) and by property (II).
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Our second result pertains the budget-balance property of the mechanisms. Again, the
correspondence with the Shapley value is crucial to establish the result.
Theorem 5.6. Let pi be an optimal allocation for S = 〈A, G, ω〉 w.r.t. t. Then, it holds
that
∑
i∈A p
ξ
i (pi, t) = 0.
Proof. By Theorem 5.4, we know that ui(pi, t) = φi(G
best
S,t), for each agent i ∈ A and optimal
allocation pi, where φi(G
best
S,t) is the Shapley value of G
best
S,t . By property (I) of the Shapley
value, we know that
∑
i∈A φi(G
best
S,t) = bestS,t(A). Thus,
∑
i∈A ui(pi, t) =
∑
i∈A φi(G
best
S,t ) =
opt(〈A, G, ω〉, t). It follows that opt(〈A, G, ω〉, t) =
∑
i∈A vi(pi)−
∑
i∈A p
ξ
i (pi, t), by defini-
tion of the utility. Hence,
∑
i∈A p
ξ
i (pi, t) = opt(〈A, G, ω〉, t) − val(pi, t) = 0, as pi is indeed
an optimal allocation w.r.t. t (and, hence, w.r.t. verified types).
Corollary 5.7 (budget-balance). Let A be any optimal allocation algorithm. Then, the
mechanism with verification (A,pξ) is budget-balanced.
Finally, we complete the picture of our analysis by proving the strong fairness property
of the proposed payment rule pξ: In words, the best outcome for every agent is always
determined by a (global) optimal allocation. Moreover, from Corollary 4.12, any agent
is indifferent about the specific optimal allocation being considered. That is, any chosen
optimal allocation leads to the best results for all agents.
Lemma 5.8. Let pi and pi′ be two allocations for S = 〈A, G, ω〉 such that pi is optimal, and
hence val(pi, t) ≥ val(pi′, t). Then, ui(pi, t) ≥ ui(pi
′, t) holds, for each i ∈ A. Moreover, if
pi′ is not optimal, there exists some agent i ∈ A such that ui(pi, t) > ui(pi
′, t).
Proof. For any allocation p¯i, consider the coalitional game Gp¯i = 〈A, vp¯i〉 such that vp¯i(C) =
opt(〈C, img(p¯i), ω〉, t), for each C ⊆ A. By looking at the expression of the Shapley value
for Gp¯i, it is easy to check that ui(p¯i, t) = φi(G
p¯i) (just use the same reasoning leading
to Equation 2 in the proof of Theorem 4.11). Assume now that pi′ is an allocation with
val(pi, t) ≥ val(pi′, t), and consider the value vpi
′
(C) = opt(〈C, img(pi′), ω〉, t), for each
C ⊆ A. By Corollary 4.6, we have that vpi(C) ≥ vpi
′
(C), for each C ⊆ A. Then, we derive
that ui(pi, t) = φi(G
pi) ≥ φi(G
pi′) = ui(pi
′, t) for every i ∈ A, because of property (III) of the
Shapley value.
Now assume that pi′ is not optimal, and thus val(pi, t) > val(pi′, t). Therefore, for the
grand-coalition A, we have vpi(A) > vpi
′
(A). Because of property (I) of the Shapley value,
only (and all) the total value vpi
′
(A) is distributed to agents. It follows that there exists
some agent i ∈ A such that ui(pi, t) = φi(G
pi) > φi(G
pi′) = ui(pi
′, t).
Because, truthful declarations lead to optimal allocations, the desired fairness property
is immediately entailed by the previous lemma.
Theorem 5.9 (Fairness). Let A be any optimal allocation algorithm. Then, for any agent
i ∈ A and any allocation pi, ui(A(t), t) ≥ ui(pi, t).
Corollary 5.10 (Pareto-efficiency and envy-freeness). Let A be any optimal allocation
algorithm. Then, the mechanism with verification (A,pξ) is Pareto efficient and envy-free.
Note that the above fairness condition guarantees much more than classical Pareto effi-
ciency and envy-freeness, because it entails that the mechanism leads to a unique evaluation,
independently of the chosen optimal allocation. In particular, the Pareto set is a singleton.
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6. Complexity Issues
In this section, we shall reconsider our mechanism with verification from a computational
perspective. Note first that computing an optimal allocation on the basis of the reported
types is an easy task, which can be carried out via adaptations of classical matching algo-
rithms. Indeed, in the light of Fact 4.2, computing an optimal allocation for 〈A, G, ω,w〉
reduces to computing an optimal allocation for 〈A1, G,1〉 w.r.t. w1, which is a scenario
where each agent can be allocated one good at most. This is equivalent to find a matching
of maximum weight over a complete bipartite graph over the set of disjoint nodes A1 and
G, and where edge weights are encoded via the function w1. This task is well-known to be
feasible in polynomial time (e.g., Schrijver, 2003).
6.1 Hardness Result
Despite optimal allocations can be computed in polynomial time, our mechanism is not
computationally-efficient, since payments are unlikely to be computable in polynomial time.
Indeed, we next show that this computation problem is complete for the complexity class
#P (see Papadimitriou, 1993).
For the sake of completeness, we recall here that a counting Turing machine is a standard
nondeterministic Turing machine with an auxiliary output device that prints in binary
notation the number of accepting computations induced by the input. It has (worst-case)
time complexity f(n) if the longest accepting computation induced by the set of all inputs
of size n takes f(n) steps. Then, #P is the class of all functions that can be computed
by counting Turing machines of polynomial time complexity. A prototypical #P-complete
problem is to count the number of truth variable assignments that satisfy a Boolean formula.
Of course, NP⊆#P, and a polynomial-time algorithm for solving a #P-complete problem
would imply P = NP.
Theorem 6.1. Computing the Shapley value of coalitional games associated with allocation
problems (as in Definition 5.1) is #P-complete.
Proof. The problem belongs to #P, because computing the Shapley value is known to be fea-
sible in #P for any class of coalitional games with polynomial-time value/cost functions (c.f.
Deng & Papadimitriou, 1994). To show that it is #P-hard, we exhibit a reduction from the
following problem: Let G = (A∪B,E) be a bipartite graph with |A| = |B| = n, E ⊆ A×B,
and |E| = m ≥ n. Recall that a matching is a set E′ ⊆ E of edges such that for each pair
of distinct edges (a, b) and (a′, b′) in E′, a 6= a′ and b 6= b′ hold. The matching E′ is perfect
if |E′| = n. The problem of counting the number of perfect matchings in such bipartite
graphs is #P-complete (Valiant, 1979a).
Given a graph G = (A∪B,E) as above and a constant k ≥ 1 (which we shall fix below),
we build in polynomial-time a tuple S(G) = 〈A, G, ω〉 and a type vector t such that:
(1) A = {α} ∪
⋃
(a,b)∈E{(a, b)
1, ..., (a, b)k}, i.e., agents are one-to-one associated with k
distinct clones of each edge (a, b) ∈ E, plus a distinguished node α. Note that |A| > n,
because in the considered bipartite graphs m ≥ n holds;
(2) G = {gα} ∪A ∪B, i.e., goods correspond to nodes, plus a distinguished good gα;
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(3) w is the function such that ω(α) = 1, and ω((a, b)i) = 2, for each (a, b) ∈ A and
i ∈ {1, ..., k};
(4) Types are as follows. For each (a, b)i ∈ A, t(a,b)i(a) = 2, t(a,b)i(b) = 2, t(a,b)i(gα) = 1,
t(a,b)i(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ (A ∪B) \ {a, b}. Moreover, tα(gα) = 1, tα(x
′) = 0, ∀x′ ∈ (A ∪B).
Let us now fix some notations. For any set E′ ⊆ E of edges, let match(E′) denote the
size of the largest set E′′ ⊆ E′ of edges that is a matching. For any set C ⊆ A \ {α} of
agents, let A(C) = {a | (a, b)i ∈ C} and B(C) = {b | (a, b)i ∈ C}. Finally, we say that
C ⊆ A \ {α} is tight if it does not contain two agents of the form (a, b)i and (a, b)j , with
i 6= j, i.e., associated with the same edge of G.
Observe that, for each set C ⊆ A \ {α} of agents,
opt(〈C ∪ {α}, G, ω〉, t) − opt(〈C, G, ω〉, t) =
{
1 if C is tight, and |C| = A(C) = B(C)
0 otherwise
(3)
Indeed, if pi′C is an optimal allocation for 〈C ∪ {α}, G, ω〉 w.r.t. t, then we always have that
val(pi′C , t) = 2× |A(C)|+ 2× |B(C)|+ 1. Instead, if piC is an optimal allocation for 〈C, G, ω〉
w.r.t. t, then we have
val(piC) =
{
2× |A(C)|+ 2× |B(C)| if C is tight, and |C| = A(C) = B(C)
2× |A(C)|+ 2× |B(C)|+ 1 otherwise
By exploiting Equation 3, we can now express the Shapley value of the game Gbest
S(G),t for
agent α in a convenient way. Let Xh denote the number of sets C ⊆ A\{α} of agents which
are tight and such that |C| = |A(C)| = |B(C)| = h, and let X0 = 1. Then,
φα(G
best
S(G),t) =
|A|−1∑
h=0
(|A| − h− 1)!(h)!
|A|!
Xh. (4)
In particular, let us now focus on the coefficient Xh. Denote by Yh the number of matchings
in G whose cardinality is h. By construction of S(G) it is immediate to check that for each
matching of cardinality h in G, there are precisely kh sets of agents C ⊆ A \ {α} that are
tight and such that |C| = |A(C)| = |B(C)| = h. Thus, we can rewrite the above expression:
φα(G
best
S(G),t) =
|A|−1∑
h=0
(Zh × Yh)× k
h, with Zh =
(|A|−h−1)!(h)!
|A|! . (5)
For an expression as the one above, given the value of φα(G
best
S(G),t), it is known that under
certain circumstances we can reconstruct in polynomial time the value of each single term
of the form Zh×Yh (see Fact 6 in the work by Valiant (1979b)): We need the existence of an
integer constant A > 2 such that, for each h ∈ {0, ..., |A| − 1}, Zh × Yh ≤ A, and k ≥ A
2.
In our case, it can be noticed that, for each h ∈ {0, ..., |A| − 1}, Zh × Yh ≤ 1 holds, as
Yh ≤ |A|!/((h)!(|A| − h)!). Thus, for k = 9, we have that, given the value of φα(G
best
S(G),t), we
can compute in polynomial time all such terms. In particular, we can compute in polynomial
time the term associated to h = |A| = |B| = n, where recall that |A| > n. This term has
the form Zn× Yn, with Yn being the number of perfect matchings in G. Thus, by putting it
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Input: An allocation pi for 〈A, G, ω〉, a vector w ∈ D, and an integer m > 0;
Assumption: A verifier v is available. Let v(pi) = (v1, ..., vn);
1. Generate a set Cˆ of m subsets of A, and add to them the grand-coalition A;
2. For each set C ∈ Cˆ,
3. | Compute an optimal allocation piC for 〈C, img(pi), ω〉 w.r.t. w;
4. ⌊ Compute an optimal allocation piC\{i} for 〈C \ {i}, img(pi), ω〉 w.r.t. w;
5. For each agent i ∈ A,
6. ⌊ Compute ξi(pi,w) as in Figure 5 (steps 4—8), with C := Cˆ;
7. Repeat Θ(log(1/δ)) times steps 1, 2, and 5, and
8. Let ξˆ(pi,w) be the component-wise median vector of these vectors ξ(pi,w);
9. Define pˆξi (pi,w) := ξˆi(pi,w)− vi(pi);
Figure 6: Payment rule pˆξ.
all together and since Zn can be computed in polynomial time (as the size of the numbers
n and |A| are logarithmic w.r.t. the size of G), the number of perfect matchings in bipartite
graphs can be counted in polynomial time too, which concludes the proof.
By Lemma 4.7 and Theorem 5.4, the following is immediate.
Corollary 6.2. Computing the payments as given by the rule pξ is #P-complete.
6.2 A Fully Polynomial-Time Randomized Approximation Scheme
An approach to circumvent the intractability of the Shapley value is based on approximation:
For a game G = 〈N,ϕ〉, a vector φˆ is an ε-approximation of the Shapley value if |φˆi−φi(G)| ≤
ε× φi(G) holds, for each i ∈ N .
Recently, a sampling method conceived by Bachrach, Markakis, Resnick, Procaccia,
Rosenschein, and Saberi (2010) for the special class of simple coalitional games has been
extended to deal with arbitrary games that are supermodular andmonotone8 (Liben-Nowell,
Sharp, Wexler, & Woods, 2011), under the assumption that the value ϕ(R) can be computed
by an oracle having unitary cost, for each R ⊆ N . The result is that, for any ε > 0 and
δ > 0, it is possible to compute in time poly(N, 1/ε, log(1/δ)) a vector φˆ that is an ε-
approximation of the Shapley value with probability of failure at most δ. A method with
this properties is called a fully polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme.
Next, we propose a payment rule pˆξ that is founded on the sampling strategy described
in the work by Liben-Nowell et al. (2011). The payment rule, reported in Figure 6, samples
m subsets of A storing them in Cˆ, and then computes the value ξ(pi,w) as in Figure 5, but
with Cˆ playing the role of the power-set C. Eventually, the process is repeated Θ(log(1/δ))
times, and the component-wise median vector of all such payments is computed. Finally,
at step 9, the usual compensation and bonus approach is implemented.
Interestingly, though the new rule pˆξ is based on randomization, the following properties
still hold (always, not just as expected outcomes).
8. Monotonicity of G means that ϕ(R) ≥ ϕ(T ), ∀T ⊆ R ⊆ N .
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Theorem 6.3. Let A be any optimal allocation algorithm. Then, the mechanism with
verification (A, pˆξ) is truthful and individually-rational.
Proof. The result follows by inspecting the proofs for rule pξ in Section 4. Indeed, it
can be immediately checked that those proofs do not depend on the specific subset of
coalitions C, and thus they smoothly apply if any set of coalitions Cˆ is used as in Figure 6,
instead of all possible subsets of A. Note in particular that, despite the payment rule is
based on randomization, the resulting mechanism is always truthful: just look at the proof
of Theorem 4.8, and notice that properties (A) and (B) are precisely those guaranteeing
truthfulness, and that these properties hold for each given coalition C. Therefore, they still
hold for any subset of coalitions randomly chosen by the mechanism.
For continuing with a deeper analysis of the payment rule pˆξ, we need to point out a
relationship between utility values and approximations of the Shapley value.
Lemma 6.4. Let A = {1, ..., |A|}, and let m = Θ(|A|2/ε2). Then, for each optimal allo-
cation pi for S w.r.t. t, the vector (u1,pˆξ(pi, t), ..., u|A|,pˆξ(pi, t)) is in expectation the Shapley
value of GmargS,t (and G
best
S,t), of which it is an ε-approximation, with probability 1− δ.
Proof. By exploiting the same line of reasoning as in the proofs in Section 4 for pξ, we can
see that ξi(pi, t) (at step 6 of the algorithm in Figure 6) can be rewritten as follows:
ξi(pi, t) =
∑
C∈Cˆ
(|A| − |C|)!(|C| − 1)!
|A|!
(
margS,t(C)− margS,t(C \ {i})
)
.
Now, recall that the game GmargS,t = 〈A, margS,t〉 is supermodular by Theorem 5.3. More-
over, GmargS,t is clearly monotone. Thus, by Theorem 4 in the work by Liben-Nowell et al.
(2011), we derive the result in the statement, but for the fixed value of δ = 1/4. Steps 7
and 8 just serve to amplify the probability (c.f. Liben-Nowell et al., 2011), and to get a
fully polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme.
As the expected utility profile coincides with the Shapley value, it is easy to see that pˆξ
enjoys in expectation all the properties of pξ (e.g., Pareto-efficiency and envy-freeness). We
thus focus in this section on those properties that can be shown to hold always, i.e., not just
in expectation. With this respect, note that in the approach by Liben-Nowell et al. (2011),
a final normalization step is carried out to preserve the budget balance. Unfortunately, this
way truthfulness might be lost, hence we did not include such a normalization procedure in
the above payment rule. As a consequence, the mechanism pˆξ does not guarantee budget-
balancedness and Pareto-efficiency. However, we can still have approximate counterparts
for Theorem 5.5 and Theorem 5.6.
Theorem 6.5. Let pi be an optimal allocation for S w.r.t. t. Let m = Θ(|A|2/ε2). Then,
with probability 1− δ,
• (1 + ε)× bestS,t(C) ≥
∑
i∈C ui,pˆξ(pi, t) ≥ (1− ε)× margS,t(C), for each C ⊆ A;
• ε× val(pi, t) ≥
∑
i∈A pˆ
ξ
i (pi, t) ≥ −ε× val(pi, t).
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Proof. Here, just observe that, in the light of Lemma 6.4 and Theorem 5.4, for each set
C ⊆ A, we have (1 − ε) ×
∑
i∈C ui,pˆξ(pi, t) ≤
∑
i∈C ui,pξ(pi, t) ≤ (1 + ε) ×
∑
i∈C ui,pˆξ(pi, t).
The result then follows by substituting such bounds in Theorem 5.5 and Theorem 5.6,
respectively, with simple algebraic manipulations.
Finally, we propose a further randomized mechanism that is able to guarantee both eco-
nomic efficiency and budget-balancedness. The price to be paid is however that truthfulness
holds in expectation only. The mechanism is based on a payment rule p¯ξ.
Theorem 6.6. Let A be any optimal allocation algorithm. Then, the (randomized) mecha-
nism with verification (A, p¯ξ) is truthful in expectation. Moreover, (at the truthful equilib-
rium) it is efficient, individually-rational and budget-balanced.
Proof. The payment rule p¯ξ follows the steps in Figure 6, with minor modifications at
step 8 and step 9: First, at step 8, whenever we compute the median value ξˆi(pi,w)
for agent i, we also compute the corresponding value ξˆi(pi,v(pi)) (evaluated on the re-
vealed types rather than on the reported ones). Then, we define a normalization factor
R = opt(〈A, img(pi), ω〉,v(pi))/(
∑
i∈A ξˆi(pi,v(pi))), so that, at step 9, p¯
ξ
i (pi,w) is eventually
returned as vi(pi)− ξˆi(pi,w)×R.
Concerning truthfulness, we can just note that the expected value of R is 1. Indeed,
by Lemma 6.4, the expected value of ξˆi(pi,v(pi)) is ξi(pi,v(pi)); hence, the sum of all these
values coincides with opt(〈A, img(pi), ω〉,v(pi)) by the efficiency of the Shapley value (as in
the proof of Theorem 5.6). Thus, the expected utility of an agent i under the payment rule
p¯ξ coincides with the (actual, i.e., not in expectation) utility of i under the rule pˆξ. Hence,
truthfulness in expectation follows by Theorem 6.3. Now, we can just check that, at the
truthful equilibrium, the maximum social welfare is achieved (equilibrium efficiency) and∑
i∈A p¯
ξ
i (pi, t) = opt(〈A, img(pi), ω〉,v(pi))−
∑
i∈A ξˆi(pi,w)×R = 0. That is, the mechanism
is budget-balanced, too. Finally, the mechanism p¯ξ is seen to be individually-rational, by
exploiting the same line of reasoning as the one used for the mechanism based on pξ, since
the corresponding proof in Section 4 is not affected by the sampling strategy.
7. Related approaches to Mechanisms with Verification
We next review the main approaches in the literature for mechanisms with verification.
In the works by Auletta et al. (2009), Penna and Ventre (2009), Krysta and Ventre
(2010) and Ferrante et al. (2009), the individual welfare of an agent i, given the outcome
pi and the vector d of reported types, is assumed to be of the following form:
ui,p(pi,d) = ti(pi)−
{
0 if i is caught lying
pi(pi,d) otherwise
where pi(·, ·) is a payment that does not depend on the vector t of the true types.
In these papers, the only information that is assumed to be available at payment time
is whether the reported type di of agent i differs or not from its actual true type ti, so
that the knowledge of ti is basically immaterial. On the other hand, the specific payment
scheme adopted punishes those agents that are caught lying. Therefore, while the verifi-
cation process provides a smaller amount of information than the verification process in
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our approach, the rules used to discourage strategic behaviors are stronger than ours and
based on punishing agents. Moreover, the above works assume that agents’ misreporting is
restricted only to certain kinds of lies (e.g., values lower than the corresponding true ones),
so that a form of “one-sided” verification suffices.
Recently, the above model of (partial) verification has been extended by Caragiannis
et al. (2012) to a setting where an agent cheating on her/his type will be identified with
some probability that may depend on her/his true type, the reported type, or both. The
payment scheme is exactly the same as the one discussed above and, hence, verification does
not exploit the knowledge of the actual true type and a punishment approach is still used.
The main novelty, in addition to the probabilistic verification, is that there is no constraint
on the type that an agent can report while cheating.
Finally, a different kind of verification model goes back to the seminal paper by Nisan
and Ronen (2001), and is actually closer to our “no-punishment” perspective, because an
agent i can in principle be paid by the mechanism even if i has been caught lying. Given n
agents, Nisan and Ronen (2001) consider a vector e = (e1, ..., en) of “observed” agent types,
which are completely known after the verification process. Moreover, the individual utility
of any agent i has the form:
ui,p(pi,d) = ei(pi)− pi(pi,d),
so that the vector e in such a framework plays the same role as the vector of verified
types in our approach. Note that in some settings it does not make sense to assume that
the utility of an agent depends on verified/observed types (cf. Penna & Ventre, 2009).
In our motivating scenario, this is not the case, as the funds received by researchers are
precisely determined by the verifier (i.e., ANVUR evaluation), here playing ideally the role
of providing an “objective” utility to the agents or, putting it in more pragmatic terms, an
utility determined by external constraints—in fact by law.
A first difference between the work by Nisan and Ronen (2001) and our approach is
that, in the above model, agents’ misreporting is again restricted only to certain kind of
lies. Another more subtle difference is that our verification process can be defined as a
good-centric one, because at payment time everything is known about each verified good.
More precisely, if good g has been verified, then we know everything about its value, that
is, its actual evaluation ti(g) according to each agent i, even if g is not allocated to i (recall
that our mechanism is in fact indifferent with respect to alternative allocations). Instead,
the setting by Nisan and Ronen (2001) can be viewed as an agent-centric one, because the
true type of each agent i for the goods allocated to i are disclosed by the verification process.
It is easy to see that a good-centric verification provides more information, in general. On
the other hand, this additional information turns out to be the crucial feature to overcome
classical impossibility results, and to meet all desirable properties at once (without using
any punishing power). Moreover, it is worthwhile noting that good-centric and agent-centric
verifications have the same power on all classes of problems where ti(g) = tj(g), for every
good g ∈ G and each pair of agents i, j ∈ A with positive valuations about g, that is,
whenever the application at hand is such that the value of a good is an objective property
and hence, if the good is verified, it is disclosed for all agents at once. For instance, as
discussed in Section 3, our motivating scenario about the 2012 Italian research assessment
programme is precisely of this form.
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8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed and analyzed mechanisms for fair allocation problems. In
classical settings, it is well-known that there is no truthful mechanism that can be simulta-
neously efficient, budget-balanced, and fair. Here, motivated by a real-world problem, we
have considered mechanisms with verification, where payments to agents can be performed
after the final outcome is known and verified. In particular, we have proposed a model
of verification that is able to disclose the true values of allocated goods, in contrast to
previous approaches in the literature where partial and probabilistic verification have been
considered. However, the use of this verification power is in fact quite limited because pay-
ment rules have been designed without punishing in any way those agents that are possibly
caught lying. The resulting mechanisms have been analyzed by taking into account both
algorithmic and complexity issues.
By looking at the proposed framework from an abstract perspective, one may notice
that it is based on two fundamental ingredients: a base combinatorial problem that deter-
mines feasible and optimal allocations, and a game-theoretic notion that describes what is
considered fair, with respect to agents’ contributions and expectations. In the application
domain addressed in the paper, it was natural to consider the weighted matching as the
basic combinatorial problem and the Shapley value as the game-theoretic solution concept.
In fact, an interesting avenue of further research is to study different instances of such an
abstract framework for mechanisms with verification, where other combinatorial problems
(colorings, coverings, etc.) and different solution concepts (Nucleolus, Banzhaf index, etc.)
may be more appropriate and best describe the problem at hands.
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